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Abstract 
Prospective memory is the ability to remember to carry out an intended action after a 
delay. However, it remains unclear how motivational aspects of the intended action, 
such as reward expectations, are integrated into the processes subserving intact 
prospective memory. The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of 
motivational incentives on prospective memory on the behavioral and on the neural 
level, while taking into account individual differences in reward sensitivity and 
personality.  
In one behavioral and two functional imaging studies, we combined a prospective 
memory paradigm with different levels of monetary reward and loss.  
Study 1 demonstrated that while personality traits such as conscientiousness are linked 
to enhanced prospective memory performance in general, individual reward sensitivity 
can explain reward-related performance differences.  
Study 2 established that midbrain and striatal regions within the reward system are 
sensitive to the level of reward associated with prospective memory cues and that 
activation differences in the midbrain region are related to individual reward sensitivity. 
We found that performance increases under high reward are accompanied by an 
increased functional coupling between frontopolar and midbrain activation.  
Study 3 compared neural responses to reward and loss avoidance expectations. We 
found that high reward led to an elevated neural response compared to low reward or 
loss avoidance. Results further showed that midbrain activation reflected reward-related 
performance differences.  
In sum, these results suggest that regions involved in reward anticipation are sensitive to 
the level of reward associated with prospective intentions and that reward information 
accordingly is part of the cognitive representation of prospective intentions. Moreover, 
the results directly link neural reward representations to reward-related performance 
differences in prospective memory. Additionally, our findings highlight the role of 
individual reward sensitivity in the context of prospective remembering.   
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1 Introduction 
 Whether it is remembering to buy milk on the way home from work, to meet a friend 
for dinner, or to attend a meeting at 3 pm - instances where we have to remember to 
carry out a specific action at a certain point in the future abound in our daily lives. In 
many of these situations, we cannot carry out the action immediately, but we have to 
maintain an intention of a specific action during a delay. This ability to maintain an 
intended action until it can be executed at a certain time in the future is called 
‘prospective memory’ (PM). By carrying out certain actions immediately while leaving 
others in a pending state, we can plan and prioritize multiple actions and action 
sequences. In this way, intact PM is crucial to our everyday behavior as it ensures that 
our behavioral goals are met.  
 Although at first glance, PM seems to be a primarily cognitive ability, it is apparent 
that there are as many kinds of prospective intentions as there are many different kinds 
of actions, leading to different personal goals. In particular, prospective intentions can 
differ with respect to the underlying motivational context. For instance, in the above 
example, the prospect of attending a meeting which could be stressful and exhausting 
might not be very appealing, while meeting a friend could be something to look forward 
to. Thus, although in both cases a prospective intention has to be maintained, the degree 
of personal motivation associated with the achievement of this goal can vary widely. 
 Experimentally, behavioral markers of intact prospective remembering have been 
extensively studied within the realm of retrieval theories of PM by varying cognitive 
aspects of PM tasks in the laboratory or, less often, in the field (Einstein, et al., 2005; 
Smith, 2003). However, very few studies have investigated motivational aspects of 
prospective intentions, and when doing so, most of them have taken a developmental or 
clinical perspective. 
 In parallel, studies using functional neuroimaging techniques have found the 
frontopolar, or anterior prefrontal, cortex to be the prominent brain structure supporting 
PM functioning, highlighting its role in the maintenance of prospective intentions 
(Burgess, Scott, & Frith, 2003; Simons, Schölvinck, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006).  
 In a different line of research, studies investigating incentive motivation have shown 
the functional involvement of the dopaminergic reward system in tasks reflecting goal-
directed behavior, such as the monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001a; Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001b).
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 However, it has not been investigated so far if motivational aspects of prospective 
intentions play a role in PM functioning. Moreover, it is yet unknown if incentive 
motivation is reflected in the brain systems underlying PM and/or reward processing 
during the processing of reward-related PM intentions.  
 The present work aimed to shed light on this issue by investigating three main 
research questions in three experiments: in experiment 1, the effect of incentives on the 
behavioral markers of PM was investigated by means of varying monetary incentives in 
a PM context. In this behavioral experiment, individual differences in personality traits 
as well as in behavioral approach and avoidance behavior were taken into account and 
related to PM performance. In experiment 2, the effects of reward anticipation in the 
form of monetary incentives on PM were investigated on the neural level by examining 
the functional interaction of reward and PM brain systems by means of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In experiment 3, the concept of motivational 
incentives was extended to include incentives of both positive and negative valence, 
discriminating the effects of reward anticipation and loss avoidance in PM with fMRI. 
 At the beginning of this thesis, a theoretical and empirical background will be given, 
consisting of two parts: first, an overview of PM retrieval theories will be provided, 
followed by a description of three selected aspects of PM that pertain to the focus of the 
present study. After this, empirical findings from studies investigating the neural 
systems supporting PM will be summarized. Second, a brief anatomical and functional 
description of the human reward system will be given, including findings relating its 
function to individual differences in motivated behavior. In the following experimental 
section of the present work, each of the three experiments will be separately described. 
Experiments 2 and 3 used fMRI. Thus, a short overview of this methodological 
approach will be given. In the last section, the findings from all three experiments will 
be summarized and discussed, including possible future directions of research. 
 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
2.1 Prospective Memory 
 Experimental PM tasks are usually modeled according to several criteria defining the 
nature of real-life PM situations. One of the most obvious criteria is that there is an 
intended action that cannot be carried out immediately, but has to be suspended until a 
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later point in time (note that in real-life PM situations, this delay can range from several 
minutes to hours or days, while in most experimental PM tasks, this delay is usually 
much shorter, ranging from seconds to minutes). A second criterion is that the delay is 
filled with other activities, preventing consistent rehearsal of the PM intention. In the 
laboratory, this has led to the implementation of an ongoing task, in which the PM task 
is embedded. Thus, participants engage in an ongoing cognitive task (e.g., a lexical 
decision task or an n-back task), while simultaneously maintaining the intention to carry 
out the PM task at the appropriate time or in response to the appropriate cue. Thus, 
execution of the PM intention can be triggered by either a time or an event cue, and 
accordingly, these two forms of PM have been termed ‘time-based’ and ‘event-based’ 
PM. Although in real-life PM situations mixed forms exist (e.g., taking medication after 
breakfast can be associated with a specified time point (8 am) and with a certain cue 
(breakfast)), experimental research has separated the two forms and examined time-
based PM (with and without external time-measurement aids) and event-based PM 
separately. The present study reports evidence from three event-based PM experiments 
and will thus focus on empirical evidence for event-based PM. 
 Empirical research has shown that performance on experimental PM tasks can vary 
with several characteristics or features of the PM and the ongoing task. For example, 
PM performance has been found to be enhanced with highly distinctive PM cues 
(Einstein, McDaniel, Manzi, Cochran, & Baker, 2000). On the other hand, performance 
decrements on the ongoing task caused by the maintenance of a PM intention (also 
termed “costs” or “prospective interference effect”) have been found (Smith, Hunt, 
McVay, & McConnell, 2007) and have been related to characteristics of the ongoing 
task (focal vs. non-focal processing, Einstein, et al., 2005). Thus, variations in the PM 
and the ongoing task (or both) can lead to PM and ongoing performance increases or 
decreases.  
 These findings have been taken to suggest that there are different possible 
mechanisms supporting the retrieval of PM intentions, which have subsequently been 
integrated into one common theory. In the first three paragraphs of this chapter, these 
mechanisms will be shortly reviewed by summarizing the empirical evidence. In the 
following three paragraphs, three specific effects or features that have been investigated 
in the context of these retrieval theories will be briefly described: importance effects, 
motivational aspects, and individual differences pertain to the topic of the present study 
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and will thus be pointed out in more detail. 
 
2.1.1 Theories of Prospective Memory Retrieval 
 Two categories of theories have been developed to explain how prospective 
intentions are retrieved. On the one hand, monitoring theories state that PM retrieval is 
based on controlled monitoring or preparatory processes (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 
2004; Smith, et al., 2007). On the other hand, it has been shown that PM intentions can 
also be retrieved spontaneously, without the implementation of controlled monitoring 
processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Einstein, et al., 2005; Scullin, Einstein, & 
McDaniel, 2009). Both views have been integrated into the “multiprocess theory” by 
specifying features of the PM and ongoing task which can lead to the implementation of 
one or the other process.  
 
2.1.1.1 Monitoring 
 Adding a prospective intention to an ongoing task leads to a decline in ongoing 
performance, in particular to a slowing of response times in the ongoing task. This has 
often been termed the “prospective interference effect” or “costs” (Guynn, 2003; Loft & 
Yeo, 2007; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, 
Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). This slowing on the 
ongoing task has been taken to indicate a controlled cognitive search process used to 
monitor for prospective targets, directing capacity away from the ongoing, towards the 
PM task (Smith, 2003; Smith, et al., 2007).  
 Smith (2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith, et al., 2007) has proposed the 
“preparatory attentional and memory processes theory” (PAM) as a framework for the 
investigation of monitoring processes in PM paradigms. According to the PAM theory, 
adding a prospective intention to an ongoing task always goes with a cost to the ongoing 
task, because preparatory processes draw off attentional resources that would otherwise 
be used for the ongoing task. Critically, task interference effects should thus be found on 
ongoing trials, as preparatory processes take up resources during those trials rather than 
during PM cue trials themselves. Consistent with this prediction, Smith (2003) found 
that the addition of a PM task produced slowing on the ongoing task, indicating that 
attentional resources are being directed away from the ongoing task. Moreover, Smith 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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(2003) predicted that participants showing better PM performance should exhibit 
greater ongoing task interference, because they rely on monitoring to a greater extent. 
Indeed, participants who performed the PM task at or above the mean responded more 
slowly to ongoing trials than participants whose PM performance was below the mean. 
These results were taken to suggest that participants who performed well on the PM 
task were directing capacity away from the ongoing task, in favor of better PM 
performance.   
 Although not explicitly designed to address specific aspects of the PM interference 
effect, neuroimaging studies examining PM have consistently found an increase in 
response times when a PM intention was maintained, compared to ongoing/baseline 
tasks (even in blocks in which no PM cues were presented) (Burgess, Quayle, & Frith, 
2001; Burgess, et al., 2003; Simons, et al., 2006). In these studies, this finding is usually 
interpreted in a more general sense as the result of a prospective intention being 
maintained. In particular, it has been associated with the checking for PM cues and/or 
the switching of attention between the ongoing and the PM task. However, due to 
methodological constraints, these studies have often employed PM designs with a high 
frequency of PM cues (~20%) (Burgess, et al., 2001; Burgess, et al., 2003), thus 
changing the nature of the PM task (presumably boosting monitoring processes) while 
leaving PM performance unaffected (Ellis, Kvavilashvili, & Milne, 1999).  
 
2.1.1.2 Spontaneous Retrieval 
 Although it has been widely acknowledged that the retrieval of a prospective 
intention can be associated with costs to the ongoing task, there have been reports of 
non-significant or low costs (A. L. Cohen, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; Einstein, et al., 
2005; McNerney & West, 2007; Scullin, et al., 2009; Scullin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 
2010a). However, spontaneous retrieval processes are defined by the absence of costs to 
the ongoing task (i.e., no significant slowing of response times when a PM intention is 
added), and thus cannot be measured in traditional PM paradigms. Shifting participants' 
PM retrieval strategies experimentally towards non-monitoring would invariably lead to 
a decline in PM performance, thus making it impossible to compare the two retrieval 
processes. Einstein et al. (2005) found a solution to this dilemma by demonstrating the 
reverse, namely that spontaneous retrieval processes can occur in the absence of a PM  
instruction. Participants were told to suspend the PM intention during an ongoing 
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lexical decision task, although prospective cues were presented. Response times to PM 
target items were significantly slower than those to neutral (but previously presented) 
items and to retrospective memory target items, indicating the existence of spontaneous 
retrieval processes under conditions in which the PM demands were suspended. The 
possibility that subjects had monitored was excluded by showing that the response times 
to neutral items in the prospective blocks were not different to those in an analogous 
retrospective memory block (i.e., no costs). 
 Scullin et al. (2009) replicated these findings and could additionally show that 
spontaneous retrieval processes can also be deactivated. In a lexical decision task, 
response times to PM target items were slower compared to control items, but only in a 
condition in which participants had to suspend the PM intention (i.e., when they were 
told that they had to perform the PM task again later). When participants were told that 
the PM task was finished, response times to PM target and control items did not differ.  
 
2.1.1.3 The Multiprocess Theory 
 Due to the fact that both monitoring and spontaneous retrieval processes can 
evidently support prospective remembering, there has been the need to define the 
prerequisites for the implementation of one or the other process. To this end, Einstein 
and McDaniel (2005; Einstein, et al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) have proposed 
the “multiprocess theory”, which allows for the existence of both strategic monitoring 
and spontaneous retrieval processes and establishes the conditions under which one or 
the other process is applied. 
 The multiprocess theory states that the use of a process in a given situation can 
depend on a variety of factors, such as the characteristics of the PM and the ongoing 
task, as well as individual differences. However, it also states that there is a general bias 
towards spontaneous retrieval processes, because accumulating costs caused by multiple 
PM intentions (as it is often the case in real-life PM situations) would be detrimental to 
the ongoing activities. 
 For instance, Cohen et al. (2008) reported that no significant costs to an ongoing 
lexical decision task were found when participants had to detect one or two PM target 
items. However, significant costs emerged with three or more target items, signaling a 
shift in the strategy according to the requirements of the PM task. 
 According to the multiprocess theory, an important factor concerning the ongoing 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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task that could potentially bias retrieval mechanisms towards spontaneous processing is 
the degree to which the ongoing task fosters focal processing of the PM target event. 
Focal processing entails that processes involved in performance of the ongoing task at 
the same time encourage processing of any given item as a potential PM target item. For 
example, Einstein et al.(2005) used an ongoing category judgment task in which 
participants had to decide if one word was a member of the category that the other word 
designated. In the non-focal PM task, the PM target item was a previously specified 
syllable, whereas in the focal PM task, the PM target item was a single word. With a 
focal target, the proportion of correct PM responses was significantly higher and did not 
lead to costs on the ongoing task, suggesting that performance relied on spontaneous 
retrieval in the focal, but on monitoring in the non-focal condition. 
 Another important factor that can have an impact on performance on a PM task 
relates to the characteristics of the PM cues. Salient or distinctive PM target events have 
been shown to elicit high levels of PM performance compared to nondistinctive cues 
(Einstein, et al., 2000). However, Smith et al. (2007) reported that salient PM target 
events do not necessarily lead to automatic retrieval of the PM intention and found costs 
in the ongoing task despite the use of salient PM target events.  
 Another parameter of the PM cue and thus a critical factor determining PM retrieval 
processes is the quality of the association between the PM cue and the intention. PM 
targets that are associated with the PM intention to a higher degree more likely lead to 
spontaneous noticing. McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, and Brenneiser (2004) showed that 
PM performance was better for highly associated than for not-associated PM target-
action pairs. Loft and Yeo (2007) extended these findings by examining reaction times 
(i.e., response costs) to items immediately preceding PM cue trials that were PM hits or 
misses. Under low-association conditions, the difference in reaction times on precue hit, 
compared to precue miss trials was larger, reflecting the difference in the amount of 
preparatory attentional processes on precue hit, compared to precue miss trials under 
low- and high-association conditions. Moreover, when response costs on precue trials 
were controlled for, response times for PM hits were significantly longer under low, 
compared to high association, indicating a higher degree of monitoring for PM cue 
events. 
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2.1.2 Importance Effects in Prospective Memory 
 As the multiprocess theory states, the retrieval of the prospective intention and PM 
performance can vary based on the manipulation of several features of the PM task. One 
of the central features that has to be taken into account when investigating motivational 
aspects of the PM task is the perceived importance of the PM and the ongoing task. 
 Several studies have reported importance effects in PM (Andrzejewski, Moore, 
Corvette, & Herrmann, 1991; Kvavilashvili, 1987; Loft, Kearney, & Remington, 2008), 
but Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, and Einstein (2001) were the first to systematically 
explore the relationship between importance effects, the requirements of the PM task, 
and PM performance. In a time-based and an event-based PM experiment, they told 
participants that either the PM task or the ongoing task was more important. They found 
an importance effect (i.e., better PM performance in the high importance PM condition) 
for the time-based, but not for the event-based version of the PM task. However, the 
authors report that participants made more errors on the ongoing task in the high 
importance condition in a demanding background situation, i.e., when attentional 
resources were scarce.  
 In an effort to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of the PM task 
and importance effects on PM, Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, and Einstein (2004) 
investigated PM performance under high and low PM importance instructions in two 
event-based PM tasks, of which one relied on relatively automatic retrieval processes, 
whereas the other relied more on controlled monitoring processes. They found an 
importance effect on PM performance (i.e., a greater number of prospective hits when 
the importance on the PM task was high). In addition, high importance of the PM task 
also affected performance on the ongoing task, resulting in a higher number of errors 
made in the ongoing task. However, this was only the case when the PM task contained 
non-salient cues and the ongoing task did not encourage focal processing of the PM 
target stimulus. That is, importance effects were only found when the processing of the 
PM task required strategic monitoring. 
 The finding of importance effects in PM tasks indicates that motivational features, 
such as the perceived importance of the PM task, can play a role in the processing of 
PM cues and can thus have an effect on performance on the PM task and on the ongoing 
task. Thus, these results provide an important link to the effects of more straightforward 
measures of motivation such as (monetary) reward on PM, which are the focus of the 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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present work. The respective findings will be summarized in the following paragraph. 
 
2.1.3 Incentive Effects in Prospective Memory 
 Very few studies have investigated incentive effects in PM. Meacham and Singer 
(1977) were the first to link motivation to prospective remembering. They used a 
naturalistic task: subjects were asked to send postcards to the experimenter on specified 
dates. Incentive magnitude was manipulated between subjects. Results revealed that 
subjects who expected to potentially receive a reward for the completion of the task 
performed better (i.e., mailed postcards less often and fewer days late) than those who 
did not expect to receive a reward. 
 Most often, studies investigating the effect of incentives on PM have focused on 
children. Somerville, Wellman, and Cultice (1983) reported an incentive effect in 
toddlers in a naturalistic setting: 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were more likely to 
remind their caregivers of activities that were of high, compared to low interest to 
themselves. 
 While Guajardo and Best (2000) did not find an effect of incentive on PM 
performance in 3- and 5-year-olds in either a naturalistic or in a computer-based PM 
task, Kliegel, Brandenberger, and Aberle (2010) recently reported that PM performance 
did not differ between 3- and 5-year-olds in a high-incentive condition, but was reduced 
for 3-, compared to 5-year-olds in the low-incentive condition.  
 Incentive effects have also been reported in patients with brain lesions: McCauley, 
McDaniel, Pedroza, Chapman and Levin (2009) found incentive effects on PM 
performance in children with traumatic brain injury. Both children with mild and severe 
traumatic brain injury as well as children in the control group (orthopedic injuries) 
showed better PM performance in an experimental, non-computerized PM task when 
incentives were high (dollars), compared to when incentives were low (pennies).  
 Important information as to the effects of motivation also comes from a recent study 
investigating the ‘age-prospective memory paradox’, which describes an age-related 
decline of PM performance in laboratory, compared to an age benefit in naturalistic 
settings (Aberle, Rendell, Rose, McDaniel, & Kliegel, in press). In this study, Aberle et 
al. (in press) provided half of the participants in one young (mean age 24.58 years) and 
one old age (mean age 62.46 years) group with monetary incentives (in this case, the 
prospect of winning a lottery) in a naturalistic task (i.e., sending a text message to the 
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experimenter twice a day for five consecutive days). They found that young adults in 
the high motivation group overcame their age-related deficit and performed as well as 
the older adults. Moreover, highly motivated young adults performed better than their 
normally-motivated counterparts, while no incentive effect was found in the old age 
group (as a side note, in an unpublished data set, Aberle et al. report that high 
motivation also eliminates the older adults’ PM deficit in a laboratory setting).  
 Although monetary incentives have been given in several neuroimaging studies of 
PM (using laboratory, computer-based PM tasks) (Burgess, et al., 2001; Burgess, et al., 
2003), the effect of different levels of incentives has not been explored experimentally 
so far. 
 
2.1.4 Individual Differences and Prospective Memory 
 Searleman (1996) found that Type A personalities (i.e., people who show high time 
urgency and a high need to complete tasks) showed better PM performance in 
interpersonal PM tasks (e.g., remembering the experimenter to make a phone call) and 
PM tasks that were of personal importance to themselves (e.g., returning a card to 
receive credit for the experiment). However, performance on a task that was neither 
interpersonal nor of personal importance was not related to differences in personality. 
Cuttler and Graf (2007a) found that the personality dimensions of conscientiousness and 
neuroticism predicted performance on two or one naturalistic PM tasks, respectively. 
Moreover, it has been reported that PM failures and self-report of PM failures are 
associated with high checking compulsions (an indicator of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD)), in sub-clinical compulsive checkers in laboratory PM tasks (Cuttler & 
Graf, 2007b, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).  
 While the above-mentioned studies used naturalistic and/or interpersonal PM tasks, 
Salthouse, Berish and Siedlecki (2004) administered four different PM tasks, of which 
three were computer-based. A composite score reflecting performance across the four 
tasks was then computed to define general PM performance. In addition, age, cognitive 
variables such as executive functioning and episodic memory, as well as personality 
dimensions were measured to explore the relationship with PM performance. 
Specifically, the NEO Five Factor Personality Inventory was used to assess differences 
in the five personality dimensions and to relate them to PM performance. The only trait 
that was significantly related to PM performance was agreeableness, but other cognitive 
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constructs (general intelligence, episodic memory, perceptual speed) did show similar 
relations to the personality factors. The authors thus state that PM performance is not 
uniquely related to non-cognitive (i.e., personality) factors, but rather shares these 
aspects with other cognitive constructs. However, by integrating performance on four 
PM tasks into one composite score, the authors did not account for the fact that the four 
tasks might have required different degrees of monitoring or spontaneous retrieval, 
which could have resulted in different relations to the personality dimensions.  
 In light of the multiprocess framework, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) proposed that 
individuals scoring high on conscientiousness and compulsivity should exhibit generally 
higher PM performance, but even more so when monitoring demands are high. 
However, they concur that individuals low on those dimensions might more likely 
adjust their strategy and thus employ monitoring only when necessary. In this case, not 
PM performance per se, but costs to the ongoing task would reflect personality 
differences.  
 On a related note, in a non-experimental design, Heffernan and Ling (2001) 
investigated the relationship between the personality dimension of extraversion and 
prospective remembering. Extraversion was assessed using the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire Revised (EPQR) and general PM performance was assessed using a self-
rating prospective memory questionnaire (Prospective Memory Scale (PMQ)). 
Introverts were found to report more PM errors than extraverts which the authors 
interpret in terms of extraverts making more use of their prospective memory system by 
engaging in planning behavior to a greater extent. However, self-reports of PM 
performance cannot be easily related to experimental PM data, and it thus cannot be 
assumed that extraversion is related to PM performance in experimental settings.   
 Taken together, very few studies have investigated the relationship between PM and 
individual differences in computer-based, laboratory tasks. Studies employing 
naturalistic task settings have related better PM performance with personality variables 
such as conscientiousness and compulsivity. However, these studies differed in the 
degree to which strategic monitoring or spontaneous retrieval was required. Moreover, 
the relation of PM with other personality dimensions such as approach or avoidance 
motivation has not been explored systematically so far. 
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2.1.5 Neural Correlates of Prospective Memory 
 Considering the large number of studies investigating PM on the behavioral level, 
relatively few studies have investigated the neural mechanisms supporting PM. In this 
section, these studies will be reviewed. Additionally, functional specialization within the 
frontopolar cortex (BA10) in relation to PM will be briefly discussed (for a brief 
description of the anatomical location and subdivisions of BA 10, see Fig. 2.1).  
 While Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, and Shallice (2000a) had already described 
planning deficits in patients with neurological lesions in the rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex in the context of multitasking, Okuda et al. (1998) explored the brain regions 
associated with the maintenance and retrieval of prospective intentions in healthy 
subjects. In their positron-emission tomography (PET) study, they asked participants to 
memorize ten target words before scanning began. Participants were then asked to 
orally repeat ten sets of five words that were presented to them auditorily. In the PM 
task, these sets included some of the previously learned target words (two or three 
targets within fifty stimuli), which participants indicated by tapping with their hand. The 
blocks of the control task were identical, but did not include any target words. 
Participants had to report the ten target stimuli at the end of both PM and control blocks. 
The authors found activation in the left superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) and more 
posterior frontal areas (BA8/9), as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) and the 
left parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28) for the PM, compared to the control blocks. While 
they related the activation of the dorsolateral PFC and of the parahippocampal gyrus to 
processes of working memory and novelty detection, respectively, they assumed that the 
activation of BA 10 and 47 are more directly related to the process of holding an 
intention mind. Burgess, Quayle, and Frith (2001) used PET to distinguish between 
regions involved in the maintenance and retrieval of prospective intentions. By 
implementing a cognitive conjunction design involving four different PM tasks, they 
intended to rule out any potential task-specific activation and reveal only activations 
reflecting the processes supporting PM. More importantly, the experimental design 
comprised an “expectation” condition, in which participants were asked to perform a 
PM task, but no PM cues actually occurred. In contrast, in the “execution” condition, 
PM cues did occur on ~20% of the trials. Burgess et al. hypothesized that in both 
expectation and execution conditions, the prospective intention should be maintained, 
but only in the execution condition could participants actually carry out the PM task. 
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Figure 2.1: a) Schematic 
view of the lateral convexity 
of the human brain with the 
location of the frontopolar 
cortex (BA10) marked in 
red. b) View of the medial 
surface of the human brain 
with the location of BA 10 
and its subdivisions overlaid 
in red (10p, 10r, 10m). 
 
 
 
Taken and modified from 
Ramnani and Owen, 2004. 
Brodmann area 10 (BA 10) is also known as the frontopolar cortex/frontal pole (note 
that the term “frontal pole” also includes parts of BA 9 in most species), the rostral 
frontal cortex or the anterior prefrontal cortex. In humans, BA 10 comprises a larger 
proportion of the cortex than in other species. It is sometimes subdivided in three 
parts, with area 10p occupying the frontal pole area and area 10r and 10m occupying 
the ventromedial PFC. In this work, the terms frontopolar cortex and BA10 are used 
synonymously for the region encompassing the three subdivisions. 
Compared to other areas of the prefrontal cortex, the density of cell bodies is much 
lower, while the number of dendritic spines per cell and the spine density are much 
higher in BA 10, indicating that the neural processing in this area likely involves the 
integration of inputs from other cortical regions. Indeed, BA 10 receives inputs from 
more posterior, supramodal regions of the prefrontal cortex to which it has reciprocal 
connections (Öngür, Ferry, & Price, 2003; Ramnani & Owen, 2004).  
Aside from its role in prospective memory, BA 10 has been functionally associated 
with the processing of internal states and relational integration (Christoff & Gabrieli, 
2000; Christoff, et al., 2001), cognitive branching and sub-goal processing 
(Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007), 
making exploratory decisions and prediction errors (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Ramnani, Elliott, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004), and 
evaluating self-generated decisions (Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2010). 
a 
b 
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Behaviorally, participants showed significant slowing of RTs in the two PM conditions 
compared to baseline, but RTs in the expectation and execution did not differ, 
suggesting that the maintenance of a PM intention caused this interference effect in both 
conditions. PET data revealed an increase in activation when participants expected to 
see a PM cue (i.e., in the expectation and in the execution condition) relative to baseline 
in the frontal pole bilaterally (BA10), as well as in the right lateral prefrontal and 
inferior parietal cortex, and in the precuneus, reflecting the maintenance of a 
prospective intention. In contrast, when intentions were executed, compared to only 
maintained, only the right thalamus showed an increase in activation, while the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed a decrease.   
 In another PET study, Burgess, Scott, and Frith (2003) reported a lateral-medial 
dissociation for the role of rostral prefrontal cortex in PM. In this study, deactivation of 
the medial part of BA 10 was found when PM blocks were compared to blocks of 
ongoing trials. However, region of interest analyses based on the location of the 
activation found in the previous study (Burgess, et al., 2001) revealed that lateral 
regions of the rostral prefrontal cortex showed an increase in activation when a PM 
intention was present. The authors interpreted these findings by proposing a functional 
dissociation of BA 10: while medial areas support attention to external stimuli, which 
has to be withdrawn in the PM conditions, more lateral areas are involved in the 
switching of attention from internal (i.e., the prospective intention) to external (i.e., the 
PM cues) cognitive representations. In the same vein, Simons, Schölvinck, Gilbert, 
Frith, and Burgess (2006) found both lateral activation and medial deactivation when 
they compared PM conditions that drew to a different extent on PM cue identification 
and intention retrieval demands. Although both conditions showed a highly similar 
pattern, intention retrieval conditions showed a more pronounced lateral activation of 
BA 10 and slightly more medial deactivation. The authors interpreted this pattern of 
results in terms of the lateral-medial dissociation: when emphasis on the detection of the 
PM cues is high, attention should be directed towards external events, but when 
intention retrieval is demanding, the attention focus should be on internally generated 
information. 
 Gilbert, Frith, and Burgess (2005) showed that rostral prefrontal cortex was indeed 
differentially activated in response to stimulus-oriented (i.e., external) and stimulus-
independent (i.e., internal) thoughts. Their experimental paradigm comprised phases of 
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stimulus-oriented and stimulus-independent thoughts through which participants cycled 
several times. Sustained activation of the medial rostral prefrontal cortex was found for 
stimulus-oriented thought, while lateral parts were transiently activated by switches 
between the two types of thoughts, irrespective of the direction of the switch.   
 On the basis of these and other findings linking lateral and medial parts of BA 10 to 
different functions (Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2007a; Gilbert, et al., 2006b; 
Simons, et al., 2006), a more general account of BA 10 function, the so-called “gateway 
hypothesis”, has been proposed (Burgess, et al., 2007a; Burgess, et al., 2008; Burgess, 
Gilbert, & Dumontheil, 2007b). The gateway hypothesis accounts for the differential 
activation of lateral and medial parts of the anterior prefrontal cortex by linking it to 
stimulus-independent and stimulus-oriented processing, respectively. In PM, attention is 
constantly switched between stimulus-oriented, or external processing, and stimulus-
independent, or internal processing to maintain the prospective intention. Thus, the 
deactivation of medial BA 10 during PM blocks is consistent with the idea of the 
suppression of stimulus-oriented thoughts. At the same time, the activation of lateral 
parts of BA 10 could represent stimulus-independent processing as evoked by the 
maintenance of the prospective intention. Moreover, lateral parts of BA 10 also seem to 
be involved in the switching between the two forms of processing. In terms of PM, this 
would involve transient activity on PM cue trials, because the external stimulus has to 
be compared with the internally stored PM target stimulus. 
 
2.2 The Reward System  
 Reward has a central function in an organism's behavior, ranging from the regulation 
of vegetative states to goal-directed behavior. It has been implicated in reinforcement-
learning (Schultz, 1998), incentive motivation (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008), goal-
directed behavior and decision-making (Knutson, et al., 2001a; Knutson & Cooper, 
2005; Knutson, et al., 2001b) and has been shown to play a role in higher cognitive 
processes such as working memory (Pochon, et al., 2002). In the following two 
paragraphs, the functional neuroanatomy of the reward system will be briefly described 
and findings from neuroimaging studies using reward paradigms in humans will be 
summarized. 
 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
 
 
16 
2.2.1 Functional Neuroanatomy of the Reward System 
 The notion of a general reward or motivational system emerged from early studies in 
animals showing that intracranial self-stimulation of certain brain regions had 
reinforcing effects on behavior (Olds & Milner, 1954). In addition, single-cell 
recordings in non-human primates targeting midbrain dopamine neurons have 
highlighted the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in reward (Mirenowicz & 
Schultz, 1994, 1996). Several brain regions have since been shown to be involved in 
reward processing. In particular, dopaminergic projections from the substantia nigra and 
the ventral tegmental area in the midbrain to the striatum, the so-called limbic system 
and prefrontal regions have been identified (Wise, 2004). Nominally, two reward 
systems have been described: the nigrostriatal system, projecting primarily from the 
substantia nigra (SN) to the striatum (nucleus caudatus and putamen) and the 
mesocorticolimbic system, with dopaminergic cells projecting from the ventral 
tegmental are (VTA) to the limbic system and to the prefrontal cortex. The latter system 
has often been subclassified into the mesolimbic system, including projections to the 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc), amygdala, septum, and hippocampus, and the mesocortical 
system, including projections to the prefrontal and cingular cortices. However, it has 
been argued that these systems cannot be separated anatomically or functionally (Wise, 
2009). For example, the substantia nigra, the origin of the nigrostriatal system, has been 
found to project to the amygdala, a region traditionally assigned to the limbic system. 
Moreover, both SN and VTA have been shown to be responsive to prediction error 
signals, with increased firing rates to unpredicted rewards and decreased firing to the 
absence of an expected reward (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994; Schultz, 1998, 2010). 
Recent evidence from animal studies has also implicated the lateral habenula in the 
inhibition of dopaminergic neurons in the SN for non-reward, suggesting that regions 
outside the traditionally defined reward system also play a role in reward processing 
(Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2007).  
 
2.2.2 Activation of the Reward System in Humans 
 In humans, the expectation of primary rewards such as food or liquids has been 
shown to activate the midbrain and ventral striatum (Beaver, et al., 2006; D'Ardenne, 
McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; O'Doherty, Buchanan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
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O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002; see Fig. 2.2 for the anatomical 
location of the human midbrain and striatum). However, for the most part, studies 
examining reward processing in humans have used monetary rewards and losses that 
can be manipulated in size and probability in tasks such as the monetary incentive delay 
(MID) task, revearsal learning, and instrumental choice or guessing tasks (Kim, 
Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2006; Knutson, et al., 2001a; Knutson, et al., 2001b; Robinson, 
Frank, Sahakian, & Cools, 2010). For example, Zaghloul et al. (2009) recorded activity 
from substantia nigra neurons with microelectrodes in two patients with Parkinson's 
disease who performed a probabilistic learning task. They found that unexpected gains 
elicited higher firing rates in SN neurons compared to unexpected losses, while no 
differences were observed when both rewards and losses were expected. 
 Consistently, D’Ardenne et al. (2008) found that BOLD (blood oxygenation level-
dependent) responses in the human VTA reflected positive reward prediction errors 
associated with monetary reward. Moreover, both midbrain areas and the ventral 
striatum, including the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), have been found to show increased 
activation for the anticipation of monetary rewards in fMRI studies using variants of the 
MID task (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Camara, 
Rodriguez-Fornells, & Münte, 2009a; Knutson, et al., 2001a; McKell Carter, Macinnes, 
Huettel, & Adcock, 2009; Simon, et al., 2010; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007).  
 However, it is still unclear whether activation in reward-related regions primarily 
reflects the affective valence of the reward, the salience or magnitude of the reward, or a 
combination of both.  
 While some studies have reported activation in the ventral striatum to increase in 
response to monetary gains and decrease in response to monetary losses (Delgado, 
Nystrom, Fissell, Noll, & Fiez, 2000; Tom, et al., 2007) or to code only the reward-
related prediction error (Yacubian, et al., 2006), others have found increasing activation 
for both monetary gains and losses, suggesting that anticipatory activation in these 
regions largely reflects the motivational relevance of an outcome (Cooper & Knutson, 
2008; McKell Carter, et al., 2009; Robinson, et al., 2010; Seymour, Daw, Dayan, Singer, 
& Dolan, 2007). In order to tease apart valence- and salience-specific accounts of 
nucleus accumbens function, Cooper and Knutson (2008) cued participants to anticipate 
certain or uncertain monetary gains and losses. They found that, when the outcome was 
certain (i.e., independent of the response given by the participants), NAcc activation 
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Figure 2.2: (a) Schematic drawing of a coronal plane of the human brain. The striatum 
(caudate nucleus and putamen) is shown in yellow. The nucleus accumbens (pink) is in the 
ventral part of the striatum. (b) Schematic drawing of an axial plane of the human brain with 
the anatomical location of the midbrain, including the substantia nigra (arrows) and the 
approximate location of the ventral tegmental area circled in black.  
Taken and modified from Mai, Paxinos, and Voss (2007), as in www.thehumanbrain.info. 
increased for anticipated gains and decreased for anticipated losses, thus encoding the 
valence of the anticipated outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, when the outcome was uncertain (i.e., depended on participants’ response 
times), NAcc showed increased activation for both anticipated gains and losses, thus 
encoding the salience of the outcome. Thus, the salience account references the 
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contingency of the response, rather than the affective value of the reward cue. In this 
context, it is important to take into account that the anticipation of a reward and the 
opportunity to avoid losses are both directed at obtaining a positive outcome and thus 
might rely on partly overlapping neural motivational systems, especially in tasks in 
which the outcome is action-contingent, as opposed to risky gambles that can only be 
accepted or rejected. Indeed, it has been reported that relief from pain is associated with 
neural activity in the midbrain and in the amygdala, reflecting reward-learning signals 
(Seymour, et al., 2005). Moreover, Kim et al. (2006) could show that avoiding an 
aversive monetary outcome recruited the medial OFC, a region previously implicated in 
the evaluation of monetary reward, suggesting that the successful avoidance of a 
negative outcome is associated with positive affective valence and thus potentially 
represents an intrinsic reward signal.  
 
2.2.3 Individual Differences in Reward Sensitivity 
 One influential model that accounts for individual differences in responses to 
incentive stimuli is the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Corr, 2004; Gray, 1970, 
1981, 1990; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Originally, this neuropsychological theory of 
personality was proposed by Gray as an alternative to Eysenck’s psychophysiological 
theory of introversion-extraversion (Eysenck, 1967; Gray, 1970). Gray suggested that 
Eysenck’s personality factors of extraversion and neuroticism be replaced by the factors 
of reward sensitivity, reflecting impulsivity, and punishment sensitivity, reflecting 
anxiety (Corr, 2004).  Thus, two behavioral systems constitute the core of this biological 
theory of personality: the behavioral activation system (BAS), a motivational system 
responding to reward and non-punishment, and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) 
(but see Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) revised theory for a description of a third 
system responsible to reactions to all aversive stimuli, the fight-flight-freeze system 
(FFFS)). Neurobiologically, the BAS has been associated with mesolimbic and 
mesocortical projections from the VTA to the ventral striatum and the prefrontal cortex 
(cf. section 2.2.1), while the BIS consists of the septo-hippocampal system and the 
amygdala (Smillie, 2008).  
 Carver and White (1994) have developed scales for self-report measures of the BIS 
and BAS, including one measure for the BIS, and three measures for the BAS: reward 
responsiveness, fun seeking, and drive (cf. section 3.1.3 for a precise description of the 
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BIS/BAS scales).  
 Several neuroimaging studies have since linked individual differences as measured 
by these scales to reward-related brain activation. For example, activation of the 
midbrain and the ventral striatum as measured with fMRI has been shown to be related 
to individual differences in approach motivation (Krebs, Schott, & Düzel, 2009a; 
McKell Carter, et al., 2009; Simon, et al., 2010).  
 While Beaver et al. (2006) reported that BAS Drive scores predicted participants' 
activation in the midbrain and ventral striatum for primary (food) rewards, studies using 
monetary rewards have consistently reported correlations between activation in 
midbrain or ventral striatal regions and individual differences in BAS scores or its 
subscales. In particular, Simon et al. (2010) found activity in the ventral striatum to 
correlate positively with BAS scores, and negatively with BIS scores. Krebs, Schott, 
and Düzel (2009a) found that, in a long-term memory paradigm, activation in the 
SN/VTA region correlated significantly with reward dependence as assessed with 
Cloninger's Temperament and Character Inventory for reward-predicting cues. McKell 
Carter et al. (2009) found that the difference in activation in the VTA and in the NAcc 
for monetary gains vs. losses was predicted by an individual reward sensitivity covariate 
(a combined score from the BAS and the Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale 
(TEPS)). In a recognition memory study, Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock and Dobbins 
(2010) found that ventral striatal activation for rewarded hits vs. correct rejections 
correlated with BAS reward responsiveness.  
 Thus, although there is evidence that individual measures of reward sensitivity can 
predict activation in midbrain and striatal regions in the MID and retrospective memory 
tasks, no such relationship has yet been reported for PM and reward responsiveness.  
 
2.3 Aims of the Study 
 The overall aim of the present work was to define the role of motivational processes 
in prospective memory. The study intended to tie together cognitive aspects of 
prospective memory that have been investigated in behavioral and neuroimaging 
experiments, on the one hand, and well-known findings in terms of reward 
representations as demonstrated in reward anticipation paradigms, on the other hand.  
 Based on previous findings, the focus of the present study centered on three main 
questions: first, is PM performance modulated by the level of reward expectation 
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associated with PM cues? As mentioned above (sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.3), incentive 
effects on PM performance in naturalistic tasks have been reported. The present study 
sought to investigate these effects in computer-based experimental tasks using 
differently sized monetary incentives (experiment 1, 2, and 3).   
 Second, do the neural processes supporting PM reflect the level of reward 
expectation associated with the prospective intentions? Previous studies have used 
monetary incentives in PM paradigms (section 2.1.5), but the present study is the first to 
examine the effects of monetary incentives on the neural mechanisms of PM (using 
monetary reward in experiment 2 and monetary reward and loss in experiment 3). 
 Third, do individual differences in personality variables play a role in the putative 
reward modulations of PM? Previous findings have suggested an effect of individual 
differences on PM and reward processing (sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.3.). Thus, the present 
study sought to assess possible interactions between individual differences in reward 
processing, personality and the behavioral and neural correlates of PM (experiment 1, 2, 
and 3).  
 
3 Experiment 1 
 In this experiment, we set out to investigate if reward has a general effect on 
behavioral performance on PM tasks, as suggested by corresponding findings in the 
retrospective memory literature (Wittmann, et al., 2005) and in earlier studies using 
naturalistic PM tasks. Moreover, we explored if individual differences could account for 
individual reward modulation of PM performance.  
 To this end, we combined a traditional PM paradigm with different levels of reward 
expectations. Reward expectation was induced by associating PM performance with the 
receipt of a high or low reward, thus establishing PM-reward contingencies.  
 The aim of the experiment was two-fold: on the one hand, the study was designed to 
investigate differences in PM performance or ongoing costs when different levels of 
reward were anticipated. On the other hand, the present study also sought to explore 
individual differences in personality, which have been linked to PM performance 
(Cuttler & Graf, 2007a). In particular, we were interested in potential relations between 
differences in PM performance due to reward and individual approach/avoidance 
motivation. 
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3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
 Fifty healthy right-handed volunteers recruited from the general student population 
of the University of Heidelberg participated in the study. Data from two participants 
were excluded because they did not follow the instructions. Data from forty-eight 
participants (24 female, mean age 24 years, range 20 - 32 years) are reported here. 
Participants were paid according to their performance in the experiment (max. 12 
Euros). The experiment lasted approximately one hour. 
 
3.1.2 Experimental Paradigm 
 As an ongoing task, participants performed a 2-back version of the n-back task (Fig. 
3.1). The n-back task has been used as an ongoing task in a number of previous studies 
(Hashimoto, Umeda, & Kojima, 2010; Jäger & Kliegel, 2008; Kliegel & Jäger, 2006; 
Kliegel, et al., 2005; Reynolds, West, & Braver, 2009; West, Bowry, & Krompinger, 
2006; West, Krompinger, & Bowry, 2005). By using the 2-back version of this task, 
which is of intermediate difficulty, we intended to ensure participants' cognitive 
involvement in the ongoing task, but only to the extent that a PM load could be added. 
 Each letter stimulus was presented for 500 ms and was followed by a blank screen of 
1500 ms, amounting to 2000 ms of total trial time. Stimuli were presented in white 
uppercase letters at the center of the screen against a black background, along with a 
colored frame signaling the reward magnitude associated with a correct response to the 
PM cues. Stimuli were presented in blocks of 100 trials.  
 In parallel to the work of Burgess et al. (2001, 2003), we included a PM expectation 
condition, in which participants were told that they might encounter PM cues, but no 
PM cues were presented in this condition.  
 Overall, there were four blocks of each of the following conditions: PM execution-
high (containing high rewarded PM cues), PM execution-low (containing low rewarded 
PM cues), PM expectation (expectation of PM cues; half of the blocks were cued with a 
high, the other half with a low reward instruction) and ongoing/baseline (no expectation 
of PM cues), in random sequence.  
 PM cues varied between blocks and were specified at the beginning of each block 
along with the reward information in this block (i.e., 2 points (5 cents) for low and 10 
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points (25 cents) for high reward) in the center of the colored frame for 3 s (in the 
ongoing condition, a zero indicated that there were no PM cue trials to be expected and 
participants thus could not score any points in these blocks). The instruction screen was 
followed by the presentation of a fixation cross for 2s, before the first trial began. A 
response criterion of at least 60% correct responses in the ongoing task was introduced 
to prevent participants from ignoring the ongoing task.  
 In order to familiarize participants with the task, each participant completed three 
practice blocks consisting of 20 trials. Two of those blocks were ongoing/baseline 
blocks, one included 3 high reward PM trials. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Prospective memory paradigm. Trials were one of three types: 2-back target trials, 
2-back non-target trials, or prospective memory (PM) cues. Participants received either a high 
or low reward (and could avoid losses, exp. 3) for correctly responding to the PM cues, given 
that a response criterion for the ongoing task was met. No PM cues occurred in the expectation 
conditions (exp. 1 and 2). For a detailed description of the experimental procedures in 
experiment 1, 2, and 3, please refer to the method sections (3.1.2, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2, respectively). 
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At the end of each block, participants received a two-part feedback: first, the percentage 
of correct responses on the ongoing trials was presented. Next, the number of detected 
PM cues was presented along with the total number of PM cues presented in this block, 
together with the block score and the total cumulative score at this point in time.  
 Altogether, there were 40 PM cue trials in both the execution-high and the execution-
low condition. The number of PM cues in each block varied between 6 and 14. In 
addition, each execution condition included 360 ongoing trials (120 2-back targets and 
240 2-back non-targets), resulting in a PM/ongoing trial ratio of approximately 11%. 
The expectation and the ongoing/baseline conditions comprised 120 2-back target and 
280 2-back non-target trials.  
 
3.1.3 Questionnaires 
 We used the BIS/BAS scales to assess individual differences in the sensitivity of the 
behavioral approach (BAS) and behavioral inhibition (BIS) system (Carver & White, 
1994; German version by Strobel, Beauducel, Debener, & Brocke, 2001). The BAS 
scale consists of 3 subscales: BAS Drive, BAS Fun Seeking, and BAS Reward 
Responsiveness. BAS Drive focuses primarily on the execution of an action in order to 
attain a rewarding goal. BAS Fun Seeking contains elements of impulsivity and 
excitement-seeking. BAS Reward Responsiveness measures the extent to which an 
individual is affected and motivated by the prospect of a positive outcome. 
 Carver and White (1994) report reasonable alpha reliabilities for the BIS/BAS scales 
(BIS .74, BAS reward responsiveness .73, BAS Drive .76, BAS Fun Seeking .66). 
 Individual differences in personality traits were assessed using the German version of 
the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992; German version by 
Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004). The NEO-PI-R consists of 240 items measuring the 
Five Factor Model: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and 
Openness to experience. Six subscales (facets) for each of the five factors allow for 
specific aspects of each of the factors to be measured. The internal consistency of the 
NEO is high (Cronbachs α between .86 and .92). 
 For accuracy and reaction times, difference scores for high – low reward were 
computed for all conditions and trial types (e.g., the difference between accuracy for 
high and low rewarded non-targets in the execution condition). Correlations with NEO 
and BIS/BAS scores were computed using a standard statistical software package 
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(PASW 18.0). 
 
3.1.4 Analysis of Behavioral Data 
 Response times were measured from the onset of the stimulus to the onset of the 
participant's response. Trials with incorrect or missing responses were excluded. 
Reaction times and percentages of correct responses were aggregated by participant and 
condition. For both response times and percentage correct responses on ongoing trials, 
we conducted repeated-measures analyses of variance with the factors condition (5 
levels) and trial-type (2 levels), treating each experimental condition as a level of the 
factor 'condition'. We then performed post-hoc comparisons (using the Bonferroni 
correction as implemented in the PASW software package) between the different 
conditions. For PM cue trials, we conducted paired t-tests to compare accuracy and 
reaction times to high and low reward PM cues.  
 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Group Results 
 Participants performed the ongoing task at a high level of accuracy (Table 3.1). An 
interaction between the factors condition and trial type indicated that accuracy levels 
differed between non-targets and targets [F(4, 188) = 3.15, p = 0.016]. For non-targets, 
accuracy did not differ between the levels of the condition factor [all ps = 1; Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons]. For targets, accuracy was lower for execution-
high, compared to ongoing target trials [t(47) = -3.28; p = 0.002]. 
 For response times, we found an interaction between condition and trial type [F(4, 
188) = 2.6; p < 0.04]. Analyses separating the two trial types revealed that participants 
responded faster to both non-target and target trials in the ongoing/baseline condition 
compared to all other levels of the factor condition [F(4, 188) = 25.75 and 31.1 for non-
targets and targets, respectively; p < 0.001 for both trial types], i.e., between 
ongoing/baseline and ongoing trials from the conditions in which a PM expectation was 
maintained [all ps < 0.001]. However, target trials in the execution-low condition were 
more slowly responded to than target trials in the expectation-low condition [t(47) = 
2.99; p = 0.004]. 
3 Experiment 1 
 
 
26 
Table 3.1: Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracy (% correct) for ongoing trials (non-targets 
and targets) in all conditions and for PM cues in the execution conditions. Standard error of the 
mean is given in parentheses. 
 
  Non-targets Targets PM cues 
 
Execution  
                    
          high 
                   
 
 
 
RT (SE) 
 
 
 
635.56 (21.46) 
 
 
 
627.0 (19.68) 
 
 
 
648.63 (13.97) 
Acc (SE) 96.58 (0.3) 77.77 (1.48) 
 
  81.41 (1.71) 
 
          low  632.92 (19.93) 625.21 (19.33) 659.83 (13.54) 
 96.84 (0.28) 
 
78.19 (1.6) 
 
  79.23 (2.06)   
 
Expectation  
 
 
 
 
623.73 (21.46) 
96.61 (0.28) 
604.98 (18.58) 
78.78 (1.51) 
 
 
 
          high 625.37 (22.85) 609.58 (19.31) - 
  96.3 (0.35) 
 
78.62 (1.7)  
          low  622.06 (21.89) 599.42 (19.05) - 
 96.91 (0.33) 
 
78.92 (1.55) 
 
 
Ongoing/baseline  547.69 (20.22) 547.0 (17.99) - 
 96.46 (0.33) 81.31 (1.46)  
 
 
 Accuracy on PM cue trials was slightly higher when participants expected a high, 
compared to a low reward, but this difference was not significant [p = 0.153]. Even 
though the accuracy difference between high and low reward PM cues was not 
significant, reward effects on accuracy ranged from -17,5% to 32,5% across subjects, 
and variability was substantial: SD = 10,4%, suggesting that individual differences in 
reward processing, rather than the absolute size of the reward, might have influenced 
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PM performance. 
 Analysis of the response times to PM cues revealed that participants were also 
slightly faster to respond to high reward, compared to low reward PM cues, but again, 
this difference was not significant [p = 0.146]. 
 
3.2.2 PM performance and individual differences 
 In a first step, we aimed at replicating previous findings of positive correlations 
between general PM performance and the personality dimensions of the Big Five (as 
measured by the NEO-PI-R). We found a correlation between a composite score of PM 
performance (collapsed across high and low reward) and the personality factor of 
conscientiousness [r = .30, p = 0.039], as has been reported in previous studies (Cuttler 
& Graf, 2007a). However, there were no correlations between PM performance and 
other personality variables (whereas positive correlations between PM performance and 
agreeableness as well as neuroticism have been reported previously (Cuttler & Graf, 
2007a; Salthouse, et al., 2004)). Moreover, neither response times for PM cues nor 
response costs (i.e., slowing on ongoing trials) were correlated with personality factors. 
 As mentioned above, reward magnitude did not lead to a performance modulation 
per se, but reward-related performance differences varied substantially between 
individuals. Moreover, regions including the so-called reward system have been 
identified as the biological basis for approach and avoidance processes. Individual 
differences in the functioning of these systems have been found to manifest as 
personality (Gray, 1970). Therefore, in a second step, we aimed at investigating if 
individual differences in PM performance elicited by the magnitude of reward were 
related to differences in personality variables. We focused our analyses on reward-
related differences in PM accuracy and response times (i.e., high – low reward). 
 
3.2.2.1 Accuracy and personality 
 We found a negative correlation for the personality factor of neuroticism and the 
difference in accuracy for high and low rewarded target trials in the expectation 
condition [r = -.42; p = 0.003]. Thus, the lower participants scored on the neuroticism 
scale, the smaller was the difference between the accuracy in the high and low reward 
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condition (Table 3.2). That is, for emotionally stable individuals, high expected reward 
tended to enhance ongoing performance, even when no PM cues were present. This was 
not the case for less stable (i.e., more neurotic) individuals, whose ongoing performance 
dropped when they expected high, compared to low reward PM cues.  
 A reward-related difference in accuracy on PM trials revealed a positive correlation 
with the factor openness to experience [r = .29, p = 0.046], which means that the more 
open participants were, the better they scored on high, compared to low rewarded PM 
cue trials. 
 
Table 3.2: Correlations between reward-related PM accuracy differences and the personality 
dimensions measured by the NEO and differences in approach/avoidance motivation as 
measured by BIS/BAS (difference scores for PM cues are from the execution conditions only).  
% correct (high-low) NEO BIS/BAS 
Execution 
- -    non-targets 
 
- -    targets 
 Openness  
(r = .289, p = 0.046) -    PM cues 
 
Expectation 
 
 
 
BAS Drive  
(r = -.311, p = 0.031) 
   non-targets 
Conscientiousness  
(r = -.327, p = 0.023) 
    
 
Neuroticism  
(r = -.42; p = 0.003) 
-    targets 
 
 
 The difference in accuracy on non-target trials in the expectation condition was 
negatively correlated with the factor conscientiousness [r = -.33; p = 0.023], indicating 
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that less conscientious individuals made fewer errors on non-target trials in the low, 
compared to the high reward condition. The latter difference score also correlated 
negatively with the BAS Drive subscale [r = -.31; p = 0.031]. This means that 
individuals with a lower appetitive drive motivation performed equally or better in the 
low, compared to the high reward expectation condition. 
 
3.2.2.2 Reaction times and personality 
 All reaction time difference scores correlated positively with the BAS reward 
responsiveness scale (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Correlations between reward-related PM response time differences and the 
personality dimensions measured by the NEO and differences in approach/avoidance motivation 
as measured by BIS/BAS scales (rr = reward responsiveness; d = drive, fs = fun seeking). 
RT (high-low) NEO BIS/BAS 
Execution 
- BAS rr (r = .40, p = 0.005)    non-targets 
 
- BAS rr (r = .295, p = 0.042)    targets 
 
- BAS rr (r = .322, p = 0.026)    PM cues 
 
Expectation 
 
- 
 
BAS total (r = .395, p = 0.006) 
BAS rr (r = .34, p = 0.018)    non-targets 
   targets - 
 
 
BAS total (r = .468, p = 0.001) 
BAS rr (r = .366, p = 0.01) 
BAS d (r = .33, p = 0.022) 
BAS fs (r = .31, p = 0.032) 
 
 
 
3 Experiment 1 
 
 
30 
In addition, the difference score for reaction times to non-targets and targets in the 
expectation condition correlated positively with the total BAS score. That is, 
participants with a high responsiveness to reward responded more slowly to high reward 
PM cues. Moreover, high reward responsive individuals also demonstrated an increase 
in response time costs on ongoing (non-target and target) trials under high reward 
expectation. Thus, for those individuals, high reward induced greater costs to the 
ongoing task, presumably as a result of increased monitoring processes triggered by the 
prospect of high reward PM cues.  
 
3.3. Discussion 
 The goal of the present experiment was two-fold: on the one hand, we wanted to 
investigate reward-related performance differences in PM. On the other hand, we 
examined the influence of personality, including measures based on biological models 
of reward and punishment, on potential reward-related PM performance differences.  
 While reward-related modulations of behavioral performance (in most cases, as in 
faster response times for rewarded trials), have been reported in the context of studies 
investigating goal-directed behavior (Knutson, et al., 2001b; Simon, et al., 2010) and 
retrospective memory (Adcock, et al., 2006), there has been no report of reward-
induced changes in behavior in the PM literature. Thus, our primary goal was to shed 
light on the question if reward effects can be found in PM performance.  
 Overall, our data revealed significant response costs on the ongoing trials when a PM 
intention was present, which were evident in the slowing of response times in all PM 
conditions, compared to the ongoing/baseline condition. The amount of anticipated 
reward did not have an influence on the magnitude of these costs. Greater costs were 
observed, however, on low reward execution ongoing trials, compared to the low reward 
expectation ongoing trials (2-back targets), probably as a result of the disruption in the 
2-back rhythm whenever PM cues appeared in the execution condition.  
Although accuracy and response times on the PM cues themselves did not show 
reward-related effects, a somewhat indirect effect of the reward magnitude associated 
with the PM cues was apparent in the performance decline on ongoing (2-back target) 
trials, in the high reward, compared to the ongoing/baseline condition. A cautious 
interpretation would be that participants invested a high amount of effort into the 
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detection of the PM cues when a high reward was at stake, leading accuracy on the 
ongoing task to decline. This decline in ongoing accuracy was not accompanied by a 
significant increase in PM cue detection accuracy, i.e., the number of detected PM cues 
did not increase with high reward. However, participants were restrained by the ongoing 
task accuracy criterion which was employed to avoid that the ongoing task was 
completely ignored. Had this criterion been lower or non-existent, participants might 
have shifted their attention even more towards the PM cues associated with high 
reward. However, the same would have been true for low reward PM cues such that 
potential differences would have been ruled out. For future studies, it would be 
interesting to manipulate the incentives/constraints for the PM and the ongoing task 
separately (much like in studies investigating importance effects), e.g., high reward PM, 
ongoing criterion: 60% vs. high reward PM, ongoing criterion: 40%, to investigate 
potential accuracy effects on both tasks. 
 The second part of the goal of the present experiment was to elucidate potential 
effects of individual differences in personality on reward modulations of PM 
performance. This investigation was motivated by earlier findings reporting that 
measures of personality could predict PM performance (Cuttler & Graf, 2007a). 
Moreover, biologically based models of personality link the behavioral responses to 
reward and punishment stimuli to the expression of personality traits (Corr, 2004; Gray, 
1970). Evidence from neuroimaging studies lend support to these theories by reporting 
correlations between functional activation of the reward system and individual 
differences in personality traits (Beaver, et al., 2006; M. X. Cohen, Young, Baek, 
Kessler, & Ranganath, 2005; Simon, et al., 2010). 
 Here, we found a positive correlation between general PM performance (i.e., the 
percentage of correctly detected PM cues independent of reward information) and 
conscientiousness, replicating earlier findings with naturalistic PM tasks in our 
computer-based PM paradigm, supporting the idea that more conscientious individuals 
are inclined to perform well on tasks involving planning (Cuttler & Graf, 2007a). 
 Reward difference scores in terms of accuracy and response times do not provide 
such a straightforward interpretation, as reward effects should pan out in opposing 
directions in the ongoing and in the PM task (e.g., high reward should lead to an 
increase in accuracy for the PM cues, but to greater costs on the ongoing task). We 
found that reward difference scores describing accuracy in the ongoing task (in 
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particular, for non-targets and targets in the expectation condition) showed negative 
correlations with the personality factors of consciousness and neuroticism. That is, 
highly conscientious individuals performed equally well on high and low reward 
ongoing trials (or even better in the low reward conditions), seemingly able to ignore 
the distraction caused by the reward information of the PM cues or investing the same 
amount of effort, irrespective of incentive motivation. 
 Interestingly, we also found a negative correlation between neuroticism and reward-
related difference scores, complementing previous findings of correlations between PM 
performance and conscientiousness as well as neuroticism (Cuttler & Graf, 2007a). In 
the same vein as conscientiousness, the personality trait of neuroticism seems to be 
associated with the ability to ignore distracting information about the reward value of 
the PM cues and ensure that performance levels on the ongoing task are not affected by 
motivational incentives. 
 Interestingly, we also observed a positive correlation between PM difference scores 
(i.e., accuracy on high – accuracy on low reward PM cues) and openness, meaning that 
more open individuals tended to score better on PM cue trials when a high reward was 
involved, whereas the reverse was true for less open individuals. 
 A more consistent pattern was observed for response time differences: participants 
with a high approach motivation, in particular with high reward responsiveness, tended 
to take longer to respond to both PM and ongoing trials in the high reward context. 
Thus, under high reward, they seemed to take more time (within the time window given 
by the trial definition) to decide about the trial status of an item, probably to avoid 
missing the high reward PM cues.  
 In summary, our findings fit well with previous studies reporting a link between PM 
performance and personality traits such as conscientiousness or neuroticism which are 
related to high planning and structuring abilities (Cuttler & Graf, 2007a). Our findings 
are in line with McDaniel and Einstein’s (2000) prediction in light of the multiprocess 
framework that these differences would emerge when the PM task required strategic 
monitoring processes, which was the case in this experiment.  
 In addition, we show that, on the group level, there was a tendency to sacrifice 
accuracy on the ongoing task in a high reward context, but no reward-related differences 
were found in response costs (i.e., response times for ongoing trials). However, response 
time differences for high and low rewarded trials were found to covary with individual 
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reward responsiveness, indicating that, in high reward responsive individuals, 
information about the reward magnitude of an upcoming PM event is incorporated in 
the response pattern of an otherwise purely cognitive task.  
 Taken together, these findings are in line with previous reports of correlations 
between personality measures based on the Five Factor Inventory (NEO), and PM 
performance. At the same time, we extend previous findings by relating them to 
biologically based aspects of personality as in measures brought forth by the 
reinforcement sensitivity theory, explaining the expression of personality by individual 
responses to reward and punishment. As these self-reported biologically based traits 
have also been associated with an increase in functional activation in neuroimaging 
experiments, it seems likely that they might also play a role in the neural processing of 
possible reward modulations of PM.  
  
4 Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the effects of reward on the neural 
mechanisms supporting PM. On the one hand, this was motivated by the fact that 
behavioral and correlational findings from experiment 1 suggested a potential reward 
modulation of PM, as did findings from earlier behavioral studies (Aberle, et al., in 
press; Meacham & Singer, 1977; Somerville, et al., 1983).  
 On the other hand, the involvement of reward-related brain regions such as the 
midbrain and the ventral striatum has been reported in the context of goal-directed 
behavior and retrospective memory (Adcock, et al., 2006; Knutson, et al., 2001a; 
Knutson, et al., 2001b). Although previous neuroimaging studies of PM have used 
monetary incentives to emphasize the importance of the PM task, the involvement of 
these regions has not been explored systematically so far. 
 We used fMRI to investigate if the level of reward anticipation associated with a 
prospective intention would differentially affect PM related neural activity, suggesting 
an interaction between the cognitive processes mediating PM and motivational 
processes associated with the anticipation of reward. In addition, we used an 
independent localizer experiment to identify brain regions associated with reward 
anticipation per se. We then used these regions as regions-of-interest for the PM 
experiment which involved rewarded PM cues. 
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 Specifically, the following three questions were examined: First, we were interested 
in whether or not the maintenance of the prospective intention as reflected in the 
activation of BA 10 would be affected by the level of anticipated reward associated with 
the PM cue.  
 Second, we examined if neural reward effects on PM were modulated by individual 
differences in reward-related personality traits measured by the BIS/BAS scores (Gray, 
1970, 1990) reflecting individual sensitivity to rewarding stimuli.  
 Third, we also explored if the functional coupling between reward related 
dopaminergic systems and the frontopolar cortex, during PM, was modulated by reward 
magnitude.  
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General Methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a non-invasive technique that 
allows the mapping of variations in blood flow in different brain areas to cognitive 
tasks and functions. The basic principle of fMRI is the measurement of the 
hemodynamic changes that accompany task-related neural activity. In the following 
section, the underlying physiological changes and the measurement methods of fMRI 
will be shortly summarized. 
Increased metabolism in the populations of neurons that are active during a specific 
cognitive task leads to a decrease in oxygen, which is compensated by a dilation of 
blood vessels and increased blood flow in these specific areas. Usually, the amount 
of oxygen provided by this compensation mechanism exceeds the need for oxygen in 
the respective brain region. Blood has different magnetic properties depending on the 
amount of oxygen: while oxygenated hemoglobin is diamagnetic, deoxygenated 
hemoglobin is paramagnetic. This change in the ratio of oxygenated and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin leads to inhomogenities in the magnetic field that can be 
measured with fMRI by using T2*-weighted images that are susceptible to field 
inhomogenities. This effect is called the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
effect and was first described in rodents (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990; Öngür, et 
al., 2003). It was subsequently applied to functional studies in humans (Bandettini, 
Wong, Hinks, Tikofsky, & Hyde, 1992; Kwong, et al., 1992; Ogawa, et al., 1992). 
The BOLD response consists of a short onset (note that an initial decrease, the 
“initial dip” has also been reported (Vanzetta & Grinvald, 1999)), a rise to peak, 
followed by a return to baseline, with a total duration of 4-12 seconds. Due to the 
sluggishness of the hemodynamic response, early functional MRI studies used 
experimental block designs in which events of a certain type or condition were 
repeatedly presented over an extended period of time and compared to a control 
condition, allowing for a strong signal to develop over the course of the block. In 
contrast, in event-related designs, the hemodynamic response function (HRF) is 
determined for individual trials, allowing for the comparison of trials within blocks 
as well as the possibility to exclude error trials (Friston, et al., 1998). In both kinds of 
design, two conditions can then be contrasted using the subtraction logic, leaving 
only the part of the signal which reflects neural activity going back to the effect of 
the one component in which the two conditions differ.  
For a detailed introduction and overview of the fMRI method, see Huettel, Song and 
McCarthy (2004). 
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4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
 Sixteen healthy right-handed volunteers participated in the study (8 female, mean age 
23.8 years, range 21 - 29 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
history of psychiatric or neurological diseases. Informed consent was obtained 
according to a protocol approved by the local ethics committee.  
 
4.1.2 Experimental Paradigm 
Prospective Memory Experiment 
 As in Experiment 1, participants performed a 2-back version of the n-back task as 
ongoing task (cf. Fig. 3.1).  
 Stimuli were presented in blocks of forty trials and consisted of 20 consonants of the 
alphabet, presented in white uppercase letters at the center of the screen against a black 
background. A colored (i.e., gray, light green, or dark green) rectangle framing the letter 
stimuli informed the participants of the magnitude of the potential reward associated 
with correct responses to the PM cues (i.e., no, low, or high reward). For half of the 
participants, high reward was associated with the dark green, for the other half, with the 
light green color. This frame remained on the screen throughout each entire block. Each 
letter stimulus was presented for 500 ms and followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, 
amounting to 1000 ms of trial time. Participants were instructed to indicate during this 
time whether the letter they were seeing matched the stimulus presented two letters 
before (2-back target) or not (2-back non-target) or if it was identical to the prospective 
memory cue (PM) by pressing one of three keys on a response box. Each trial was 
followed by a variable inter-trial interval of 1, 3, or 5 s (occurring with a frequency of 
~60, ~30, and ~10%, respectively, for each trial type). During this time, a small white 
square serving as fixation point was displayed at the center of the colored frame. PM 
cues varied between blocks and were specified at the beginning of each block, by 
displaying the letter that served as the PM cue for the following block and the 
associated reward (i.e., 15 points for low, 75 points for high reward; 1 point = 1 cent, 
max. 36 Euro) in the center of the colored frame for 4 s. This instruction screen was 
followed by the presentation of the white square for another 4s, before the first trial 
began. 
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 Overall, there were five blocks of each of the following five conditions: PM 
execution-high (containing high rewarded PM cues), PM execution-low (containing low 
rewarded PM cues), PM expectation-high (expectation of high rewarded PM cues, but 
they do not occur), PM expectation-low (expectation of low rewarded PM cues, but they 
do not occur), and ongoing/baseline (no PM expectation, no reward), presented in 
random sequence. In the ongoing/baseline condition, participants were instructed by the 
word “2-back” along with a zero indicating that they could not score any points during 
the following block. Both execution and expectation conditions were cued with a 
prospective stimulus and the respective reward information, but only in the two 
execution conditions did the PM stimuli actually occur. To prevent participants from 
ignoring the ongoing task in those conditions, participants were informed that they had 
to achieve at least 60% correct responses in the ongoing task in order to obtain the 
money they earned for correctly responding to the PM stimuli. In order to familiarize 
participants with the task, each participant completed 4 practice blocks outside, and 3 
practice blocks inside of the scanner, during the acquisition of the anatomical scans.   
 As in experiment 1, participants received a two-step feedback at the end of each 
block, indicating their performance in the PM and ongoing task as well as the total 
cumulative score (cf. Fig. 3.1). We collected five runs for each participant, including 
five blocks of each of the five conditions with a different block sequence for each 
participant. Each run lasted approximately 10 minutes.  
 Altogether, there were 40 PM cue trials in the execution-high and 40 PM cue trials in 
the execution-low condition. The number of PM cues in each block varied between 4 
and 12. In addition, each execution condition included 160 ongoing trials (40 2-back 
targets and 120 2-back non-targets), resulting in a PM/ongoing trial ratio of 25%. The 
expectation and the ongoing/baseline conditions comprised 150 2-back non-target and 
50 2-back target trials to assure that the target/non-target ratio was the same in all 
conditions (~33%). The number of 2-back target trials per block varied between 6 and 
10 in the execution and between 8 and 12 in the expectation and ongoing-baseline 
conditions. 
 
Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) Localizer Task 
 In a separate scanning session, participants took part in a slightly modified version of 
the monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson, et al., 2001a; Knutson, et al., 2001b) 
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that served as a localizer task to independently identify regions associated with the 
anticipation of reward, such as the ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) and brainstem 
dopaminergic nuclei (ventral tegmental area (VTA), substantia nigra). During each of 60 
trials, participants were shown one of two cue shapes (250 ms) signaling a potentially 
high rewarding outcome (20 cents; 30 trials) or no monetary outcome (30 trials), 
followed by a delay interval in which they fixated on a crosshair. The duration of this 
delay interval varied between 2000 and 2500 ms (Knutson, et al., 2001a; Knutson, et al., 
2001b). Participants then responded to a solid white target square with either the middle 
or right forefinger (the correct response was indicated by the cue). Feedback (1500 ms) 
informed participants whether or not they responded fast enough to receive the expected 
reward. Information about the magnitude of the anticipated reward was additionally 
present one second prior to the onset of the cue shapes and throughout the trial, signaled 
by a dark (high reward) or light gray (no reward) frame surrounding the stimuli.  
 An individual response time criterion was set on the basis of each participant's 
response times to ensure that participants would succeed on ~80% of the trials. Each 
participant completed 14 of these individually adjusted trials as practice (based on 14 
criterion trials) outside of the scanner. Inside the scanner, a new criterion based on 40 
trials completed during the acquisition of the anatomical scans was set before the 
experiment began.  
 In the localizer experiment, participants made fewer errors when they anticipated a 
high reward (7,7% ± 5,3%, mean ± SD) compared to no reward (19% ± 14,6%), 
[F(1,15) = 8.61; p = .01] and responded more quickly when they expected a high (228 ± 
19 ms), compared to no monetary reward (232 ± 19ms), [F(1,15) = 5.8; p = .029]. Brain 
activations (see below for methods) showed that high reward anticipation activated foci 
in the reward system, notably in one midbrain cluster and in the basal ganglia, including 
the right caudate nucleus (head and body) along with the putamen bilaterally (Table 
4.1). These clusters were used for ROI analyses (see below). Additionally, in line with 
earlier reports (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005), activation in the 
anterior cingulate cortex and in premotor areas (BA 6) was observed. 
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Table 4.1: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations for the regions of 
interest in the midbrain and basal ganglia as determined from the reward anticipation localizer 
task. 
 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value 
cluster 
size 
Midbrain       
Midbrain R 10 -20 -6 5.85 815 
Basal Ganglia       
Caudate nucleus (head) R 16 16 -10 6.03 587 
Putamen L -26 0 14 5.09 454 
Putamen R 18 14 -8 6.30 747 
 
 
4.1.3 Questionnaires 
 Individual differences in the sensitivity of the behavioral approach (BAS) and 
behavioral inhibition (BIS) systems (Gray, 1970, 1990) were assessed using the 
BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994; German version by Strobel, et al., 2001). For 
correlation analyses, parameter estimates were extracted from the activated brain 
regions and correlated with the BIS/BAS scores with a standard statistical package 
(PASW 18.0).  
 
4.1.4 Analysis of Behavioral Data  
 Reaction times were measured from the onset of the stimulus to the onset of the 
participant's reaction. Trials with incorrect or missing responses were excluded from the 
analysis of reaction times (and from fMRI analysis). Reaction times and percentages of 
correct responses were aggregated by participant and condition. For both reaction times 
and percentage correct responses, we conducted repeated-measures analyses of variance 
with the factors condition (5 levels) and trial-type (2 levels), treating each experimental 
condition as a level of the factor 'condition'. We then performed post-hoc comparisons 
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(using the Bonferroni correction as implemented in the PASW software package) 
between the different conditions. In the MID localizer task, reaction times were 
measured from the onset of the target stimulus until the onset of the participant's 
response. Trials with incorrect or missing responses were excluded from the analysis of 
reaction times (and fMRI analysis). We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the factor reward (2 levels: high, no) for the percentage of correct responses and 
reaction times. 
 
4.1.5 fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
 Hemodynamic responses were measured using a Siemens Trio 3T Scanner with a 
standard circularly polarized head coil. Foam cushions were used to minimize head 
movement. 32 oblique axial slices (3 mm thickness, 1mm gap) were acquired using a 
T2*-weighted BOLD-sensitive gradient echo, echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR 
= 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 192 mm, flip angle = 80°, in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 
mm). The first 4 images of each run were discarded to allow for stable magnetization. 
For coregistration, a T1 anatomical scan with the same slice prescription as the 
functional images was acquired. A high-resolution, structural T1-weighted MP-Rage 
scan was acquired after the functional scans. 
 All analyses were carried out with the Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). First, each 
participant's functional data set was slice-time and then motion-corrected. Data were 
spatially normalized into standard MNI atlas space (MNI 152), which involved also a 
resampling to voxel size 2 x 2 x 2 mm. Data were spatially smoothed with an 8 mm full-
width-half-maximum (FWHW) Gaussian kernel. In the case of the event-related model, 
a high-pass filter of 1/128 Hz was used to remove low-frequency noise, and an AR(1) + 
white noise model corrected for temporal autocorrelation. For the block analysis, we 
used a high-pass filter of 1/192 Hz and did not correct for temporal autocorrelations.  
 Random effects statistical analysis was undertaken twice, once using a block design 
to estimate sustained effects due to reward anticipation and the maintenance of the PM 
intention, and once using an event-related design to separately investigate the effects 
associated with the detection of the PM cues and with the processing of ongoing non-
target and target trials. In the case of the blocked analysis, blocks lasted from the onset 
of the first trial until the end of the last trial of the block. Blocks of all conditions were 
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modeled by convolving a boxcar function that had a specific onset and duration with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function. Instruction and feedback trials were 
modeled as regressors of no interest for each run. For the event-related analysis, 
separate regressors were introduced for the three different trial types (ongoing: 2-back 
non-targets; ongoing: 2-back targets; PM cue trials) in each condition. Additionally, 
separate regressors coded for missed PM cue trials and for incorrect ongoing trials. 
Again, instruction and feedback trials were modeled as two additional regressors.  
 For the analysis of the MID localizer task, we modeled the anticipation phase as the 
delay interval from the onset of the reward frame for the duration of the fixation cross in 
that particular trial, implementing one regressor for correct responses yielding a high 
monetary reward, and one regressor for correct responses with no monetary outcome. 
We included one regressor each for errors and missing responses, as well as two 
regressors coding for feedback: one for correct responses and one for incorrect 
responses.  
 For both the MID and PM task, subject-specific estimates for the contrasts of interest 
were obtained using linear contrasts across sessions.  These estimates were entered into 
the second stage of analysis treating subjects as random effects, using a one-sample t-
test across subjects. Statistical parametric maps of the contrasts of interest were 
constructed.  
 For ROI analyses explicitly testing the involvement of reward related brain regions, 
we used the midbrain and basal ganglia clusters identified in the MID localizer task. As 
the above described statistical thresholding procedure resulted in large subcortical 
clusters in the localizer task that extended beyond the midbrain, we derived our 
functional ROIs by combining an anatomical mask of the midbrain as defined by the 
Talairach Daemon Labels Masks (WFU pickatlas; Lancaster, Summerln, Rainey, 
Freitas, & Fox, 1997; Lancaster, et al., 2000; Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 
2003) with the clusters from the MID localizer task, using a logical ‘AND’ operation. In 
the same vein, separate anatomical masks of the caudate nucleus as well as the putamen 
as defined by the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) masks (Tzourio-Mazoyer, et 
al., 2002) were combined with the respective clusters from the MID localizer task.  
 Additionally, we used the activation clusters found in the frontopolar cortex (cf. Fig. 
2, Table 4.4) in the PM vs. ongoing contrast as functionally defined regions of interest 
to assess reward modulation of this region by comparing high and low rewarded PM 
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cues. Functional activation was restricted by a structural mask of BA 10 (taken from the 
same set as the midbrain mask) which was dilated in 3-dimensional space by a factor of 
1 voxel in order to ensure complete masking of frontopolar gyri. 
 To protect against false positive activations, we used a double-threshold approach 
that involves combining a voxel-based threshold with a minimum cluster size (Forman, 
et al., 1995). This nonarbitrary cluster size was determined on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulation (1000 iterations) determined with AFNI’s AlphaSim tool (Ward, 2000; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). For all four ROIs, we determined the minimal cluster size 
for an individual voxel height threshold of T > 2.95 (p < 0.005, uncorrected) to ensure 
an overall image-wise false positive rate of 5%. This resulted in the following cluster 
size thresholds: midbrain: 15, caudate: 16, putamen: 19, frontpolar cortex: 18. 
 An additional Monte Carlo simulation (1000 iterations) was conducted to determine 
cluster size thresholds for whole brain analyses. This yielded a cluster size of 145 
voxels. Activations exceeding this threshold are considered to be activated at an 
experiment-wise threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons. 
 Subsequent psychophysiological interaction analyses (PPI; Friston, et al., 1997) were 
conducted to determine if functional connectivities between brain regions were 
modulated by reward magnitude. We used the result of the ROI analysis in the midbrain 
for the block high vs. low reward contrast as a seed region (cf. Results). For the PPI 
analysis, a novel GLM was set up that encompassed three regressors, i.e., the time series 
(averaged across all active voxels) from the seed region as a physiological predictor, the 
block high vs. low reward contrast as psychological predictor, as well as the interaction 
of these two variables which served as the psychophysiological interaction term. The 
second-level random effects analysis of the psychophysiological interaction term was 
thresholded at p < 0.005, k = 145. 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Behavioral Results 
 Participants’ ongoing accuracy exceeded 60% at all times. Thus, all five blocks in 
each condition were included in the behavioral (and fMRI) analyses reported here. 
 Participants performed the ongoing 2-back task at a high level of accuracy, i.e., 94% 
(Table 4.2). A main effect of condition indicated that ongoing task performance differed 
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between the experimental conditions (i.e., high execution, low execution, high 
expectation, low expectation, and ongoing-baseline) [F(4, 60) = 7.05, p < 0.001]. 
Accuracy was lower on trials containing 2-back targets than on non-target trials [F(1,15) 
= 35.9; p < 0.001]. In addition, we found an interaction between condition and ongoing 
trial type [F(4,60) = 6.6; p < 0.001], indicating that the presence of a PM intention 
affected performance for the two types of ongoing trials, i.e., 2-back targets and 2-back 
non-targets, in a different manner. Accuracy for 2-back non-targets did not differ 
between conditions [all ps > 0.28], which was most probably due to a ceiling effect 
caused by non-targets being the most frequent trial type and thus maybe the default 
response. Accuracy on target trials was lower in the two PM execution conditions as 
compared to the ongoing condition [ps < 0.02]. Accuracy on target trials in the two PM 
expectation conditions did not differ significantly from either the two PM execution 
conditions or the ongoing condition [all ps > 0.09]. Reward magnitude (i.e., high vs. 
low) did not affect performance on the ongoing target trials.  
 Accuracy on PM trials was above chance for both levels of reward anticipation (note 
that this was the case for all but one subject who detected PM cues only in about 32.5% 
of trials in which they occurred), but slightly better for high (mean [m] = 82.9%) 
compared to low (m = 79.8%) reward. However, a paired t-test comparing accuracy for 
high and low rewarded PM trials did not yield a significant result [t(15) = 1.17; p = 
0.261]. 
 Reaction times for the ongoing trials differed with respect to the factors condition 
[F(4,60) = 19.72; p < 0.001] and ongoing trial type [F(1,15) = 7.45; p = 0.015)], but no 
interaction of the two factors [F(4,60) = 0.95; p = 0.423] was observed. Thus, we used 
pairwise comparisons for the levels of the condition factor collapsed across targets and 
non-targets. We found a prospective interference effect for all PM conditions: reaction 
times to the ongoing trials were longer for all conditions in which PM cues could 
potentially occur (i.e., both execution and expectation conditions), compared to the 
ongoing/baseline condition [all ps < 0.003]. However, neither for non-targets nor for 
targets was this interference effect modulated by the magnitude of PM-cue associated 
reward [all ps > 0.15].  
 There was no significant difference in reaction times between PM execution and PM 
expectation conditions [all ps > 0.9]. A paired t-test comparing reaction times for high 
and low rewarded PM cues was marginally significant: participants responded faster to 
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PM cues that were associated with a high (m = 585 ms) compared to a low expected 
reward (m = 600 ms), [t(15) = -2.11; p = 0.053; cf. Table 4.2]. 
 In sum, both accuracy and response times of the ongoing task reflected increased 
processing demands in the PM conditions, but there was no modulation of ongoing 
processing by the magnitude of the expected reward. A reward magnitude effect was, 
however, observable on the response times to the PM cues. 
 
Table 4.2: Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracy (% correct) for ongoing trials (non-targets 
and targets) in all conditions and for PM cues in the execution conditions. Standard error of the 
mean is given in parentheses. 
 
  Non-targets Targets PM cues 
 
Execution  
                    
                high 
                   
 
 
 
RT (SE) 
 
 
 
571.88 (18.86) 
 
 
 
607.5 (22.89) 
 
 
 
584.94 (18.91) 
Acc (SE)   94.98 (.79) 
 
  70.94 (4.38) 
 
  82.97 (4.09) 
 
                low  573.5 (17.69) 611.56 (23.73) 599.63 (15.12) 
   95.2 (.76) 
 
  71.41 (3.63) 
 
  79.84 (3.84) 
 
Expectation  
 
                high 
  
 
577.69 (20.2) 
 
 
602.63 (26.9) 
 
 
- 
   94.26 (.64) 
 
  77.36 (4.17)  
                low  569.88 (20.01) 596.38 (26.21) - 
   95.09 (.51) 
 
  76.74 (3.73) 
 
 
 
Ongoing/baseline 
  
524.5 (13.49) 
 
552.87 (20.63) 
 
- 
    96.41 (.47)   82.18 (2.59)  
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4.2.2 fMRI Results 
 In a first step aiming at replicating previous findings, we examined whether or not 
the PM network reported in earlier studies would be responsive to the occurrence of PM 
cues, irrespective of the level of reward anticipation. To this end, we conducted an 
event-related analysis, contrasting activation for PM trials (collapsed across both 
execution conditions, i.e., high and low reward) with non-target and target trials from 
the same conditions. We found left lateral BA 10 activation extending from the 
frontopolar cortex dorsally into the superior frontal gyrus, and slightly less extended 
activation in the right superior frontal gyrus, for PM trials relative to ongoing trials. 
Additionally, we found activation in the medial portion of the right superior frontal 
gyrus, extending into the anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32) (Fig. 4.1, Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations for the contrast 
between PM cue trials (high + low reward) and ongoing trials (high + low reward). 
 
  
Peak voxel (in 
mm) 
  
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value cluster 
size 
Frontal       
Superior Frontal Gyrus, Frontal 
Pole (BA 10/11) 
L -44 48 -12 8.37 637 
Parietal       
Precuneus (BA 7) L -2 -72 44 6.99 14512 
Postcentral Gyrus (BA1) L -52 -20 22 5.07 171 
Inferior Parietal Lobe (BA 40) R 46 -66 48 6.87 822 
Temporal       
Middle Temporal Gyrus (BA 21) R 68 -48 -2 7.46 835 
Middle Temporal Gyrus (BA 21) L -62 -46 -12 6.31 383 
Fusiform Gyrus (BA37) L -52 -60 -18 4.77 260 
Other       
Cerebellum L -48 -72 -30 4.35 436 
Cerebellum R 24 -42 -44 5.66 204 
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Figure 4.1: Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized 
structural images of the study participants. Activation in lateral BA 10 in the contrast of 
prospective memory versus ongoing (2-back non-target and target) trials, irrespective of reward 
magnitude (i.e., collapsed across high and low reward). Images are thresholded at p < .005, k > 
145. 
 
 We did not find activation of BA 10 on the whole brain level when we compared 
non-target and target trials from the expectation conditions with those from the 
ongoing/baseline condition. We thus constrained our following analyses on the two 
execution conditions, in which PM cues actually occurred.  
 As our primary interest lies in the effects of the magnitude of anticipated reward on 
PM, we next conducted a block analysis, contrasting the execution-high and the 
execution-low conditions, which differed only in the amount of reward that participants 
received when they correctly responded to the PM cues. While this analysis produced 
no clear effects at the whole-brain level, we observed reward modulation of brain 
activations during PM execution when testing midbrain and basal ganglia regions of 
interest (ROI) derived from the localizer task (see Methods). This analysis revealed that 
voxels in the left midbrain (x = -6; y = -16; z = -12; T = 4.93; k = 29), most probably 
incorporating dopaminergic brainstem nuclei, as well as in the right putamen (x = 30; y 
= 6; z = -4; T = 2.81; k = 22) were more active for high reward as compared to low 
reward PM execution (Fig. 4.2 a), b), c)). Interestingly, we also observed that fMRI 
activation in this midbrain region for high reward PM cues was correlated positively 
across participants with the self-reported positive affect towards reward, as reflected in 
the BAS reward responsiveness subscale [r = .50, p = 0.049], (Fig. 4.2 d)). No such 
correlation was observed between activation in this region for low reward PM cues and 
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BAS reward responsiveness scores [p > 0.91]. No reward modulation was found in the 
frontopolar cortex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Activation in the midbrain (a) and in the right putamen (b) for the effect of reward 
magnitude across blocks in the ROIs determined from the reward anticipation localizer task. 
Group functional activation maps are overlaid on the shapes of the ROIs depicted in red. 
Parameter estimates for activation at the peak voxels in the midbrain (left) and putamen (right) 
are shown in (c). Error bars denote the standard errors. Midbrain activation for high reward PM 
cue trials correlated with scores on the BAS reward responsiveness scale (d). 
 
While this initial analysis indeed suggests a modulation of PM by reward, it does not 
allow us to more specifically isolate possible effects of reward expectation on the 
retrieval of the prospective intention (during PM cue trials). We therefore next 
investigated, in the PM execution conditions, whether or not the level of prospective 
reward differentially modulated the processing of PM cues.  
 We directly contrasted activity in the midbrain, striatum and frontopolar ROIs for 
PM cue trials. We did not observe an effect of reward in the midbrain ROI for PM cue 
trials. There was no significant effect of reward magnitude on BOLD signals in the 
striatum and frontopolar ROIs. Rather, we observed activation for both high and low 
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rewarded PM cues compared to the respective ongoing trials (Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations for the contrast 
between high and low PM cue trials and the respective ongoing trials in the regions of interest in 
the frontopolar, midbrain and basal ganglia ROIs.  
 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value cluster 
size  
High reward 
Frontal       
Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10) L -38 50 20 6.04 83 
Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10) L -30 52 -2 4.7 57 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 10 
/ 46) 
R 48 42 22 3.98 54 
Medial Frontal Gyrus (BA 10) R 8 58 0 3.49 46 
Midbrain       
Midbrain R 2 -14 -10 4.46 53 
Low reward 
Frontal       
Medial Frontal Gyrus R 6 40 -12 3.84 46 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 10) R 44 50 16 5.01 166 
Basal ganglia       
Putamen R 20 16 -8 4.06 45 
 
 
 We had hypothesized that frontopolar cortex might be involved in integrating 
reward-related information with the cognitive processes underlying PM. However, 
given that the results reported thus far provided no evidence that the frontopolar cortex 
codes directly for the magnitude of reward associated with the PM cues, we used 
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functional connectivity analyses to explore whether or not the information about the 
reward magnitude encoded by the midbrain would be reflected in the coupling between 
reward-related midbrain regions and frontopolar cortex. To explore the functional 
connectivity pattern of the midbrain, we applied a psychophysiological interaction 
analysis (PPI; Friston, et al., 1997) to the block high vs. low reward contrast. The 
physiological predictor was the time series from the seed region, i.e., the midbrain 
activation cluster that responded stronger to high than to low reward on the block level. 
It was modulated by the contrast between high and low reward blocks (i.e., 
psychological predictor). The individual difference between accuracy on high and low 
reward trials was entered as a covariate on the second level of the ppi analysis.  
 Analysis of the psychophysiological interaction term, which reflects the reward 
related change in functional coupling with the midbrain seed region, revealed a positive 
effect in the left frontopolar cortex, extending into the left inferior frontal gyrus (x = 52, 
y = 36, z = 6; T = 5.38; k = 316) (Fig. 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Psychophysiological interactions of the midbrain for the high vs. low reward block 
contrast. Midbrain regions showed an increased coupling with anterior prefrontal cortex for high 
reward. Images are thresholded at p < 0.005, k > 145.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
 In this study, we investigated the effects of reward anticipation on the maintenance of 
prospective intentions. As mentioned before, some studies have used monetary reward 
to emphasize the importance of the prospective intention (Burgess, et al., 2001; Burgess, 
et al., 2003). However, the effect of reward anticipation has not yet been investigated 
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systematically in the context of PM. Here, we varied the magnitude of the reward that 
participants received for correct responses to prospective cues implemented in an 
ongoing 2-back task. Thus, prospective intentions were either associated with a high or 
low reward anticipation.  
 We replicated previous studies by showing prospective interference at the behavioral 
level, and by showing that PM is associated with the activation of frontopolar BA 10 
bilaterally. Moreover, we observed a modulation of reward-related brain regions by the 
magnitude of reward expectancies during PM, with high reward expectancies giving 
rise to activation in midbrain and striatum. The strength of the midbrain activity during 
PM was dependent on trait-level reward sensitivity. Finally, a psychophysiological 
interaction analysis demonstrated that functional connectivity between midbrain and 
frontopolar cortex was modulated by reward magnitude and reward-related effects on 
behavior. 
  
4.3.1 The Role of the Frontopolar Cortex in Prospective Memory 
 Replicating earlier studies (Burgess, et al., 2001; Okuda, et al., 2003; Okuda, et al., 
1998; Simons, et al., 2006), we found an increase in the BOLD signal in the frontopolar 
region of the prefrontal cortex for prospective memory. More specifically, we observed 
this activation to be specific for PM cues, in contrast to ongoing trials. Thus, the present 
results suggest that sustained frontopolar activation reported in earlier studies might to a 
large part be due to activity in response to the occurrence of prospective memory cues. 
While the present results do not argue against a role of frontopolar cortex for the 
maintenance of the PM intention as such, our results suggest that the detection of PM 
cues gives rise to additional processing that exceeds sustained activation elicited by the 
maintenance of the prospective intention.  
 Studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) have associated the detection of PM 
cues with the N300, a phasic negativity at 300 ms after stimulus onset that is greatest in 
amplitude over the parietal-occipital region of the scalp (West, et al., 2006; West, 
Wymbs, Jakubek, & Herndon, 2003). Moreover, PM cue trials have been associated 
with a frontal positive slow wave differentiating PM hit trials from PM miss trials. In 
these studies, ‘realized intention formation trials’ – i.e., specific trials preceding the PM 
cues that indicate the intention to be performed and that were later followed by a correct 
response to the respective PM cue trial - have been associated with a greater negative 
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frontal slow wave than unrealized intention formation trials (West & Ross-Munroe, 
2002). The positive frontal slow wave has been suggested to reflect the activity of a 
neural system supporting disengagement from ongoing activity, whereas the negative 
frontal slow wave has been taken to reflect processes supporting intention encoding that 
facilitates the detection of the PM cue when it is later encountered (West & Ross-
Munroe, 2002). Although these electrophysiological results cannot be directly compared 
to our data, they suggest that mechanisms supporting the processing of PM cues can be 
reflected in transient activation over frontopolar brain regions, which provides a 
possible link to the PM trial specific frontopolar activation observed in the present 
study.  
  The activation in anterior prefrontal cortex found in our study can be placed in a 
broader framework based on more general functions of anterior prefrontal cortex. This 
area has been found to be active in a variety of complex cognitive tasks involving long-
term memory retrieval (McDermott, Jones, Petersen, Lageman, & Roediger, 2000; 
Rugg, Henson, & Robb, 2003; Velanova, et al., 2003), subgoal processing and cognitive 
branching (Braver & Bongiolatti, 2002; Koechlin, et al., 1999), relational integration 
(Christoff, et al., 2001; Raposo, Vicens, Clithero, Dobbins, & Huettel, 2010), 
mentalizing (Kelley, et al., 2002), and the evaluation of internally generated information 
(Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Christoff, Ream, Geddes, & Gabrieli, 2003). A common 
theoretical framework has been proposed that describes anterior prefrontal cortex to be 
involved when the results of two or more cognitive operations have to be integrated to 
achieve a more general behavioral goal (Ramnani & Owen, 2004). Furthermore, the 
“gateway theory” accounts for differential activation of lateral and medial parts of the 
anterior prefrontal cortex by linking it to stimulus-independent and stimulus-oriented 
processing, respectively (Burgess, et al., 2007a; Burgess, et al., 2008; Burgess, et al., 
2007b; Simons, et al., 2006). Gilbert, Frith, and Burgess (2005) compared phases of 
stimulus-oriented thought with phases relying on stimulus-independent thought and 
reported transient activation of lateral rostral prefrontal cortex associated with the 
switching between the two forms of trials. The finding of lateral BA 10 activation for 
PM cues in the present study can be interpreted in the same vein: on PM cue trials, 
participants had to switch from the processing of the ongoing task to retrieving the 
prospective intention from memory. Thus, it is possible that activation on PM cue trials 
reflects the neural mechanisms associated with coordinating the switch between the 
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mostly externally-determined ongoing task and the internally guided retrieval of the 
prospective intention. 
 Consistent with this interpretation, we did not find evidence for the activation of BA 
10 during PM expectation blocks, in which no PM cues actually occurred. Although PM 
cue trials were randomly distributed throughout the execution blocks, we cannot fully 
rule out the possibility that the lack of lateral rostral PFC activation was caused by 
participants becoming aware that a certain block of trials would not contain PM cue 
trials. However, this account is unlikely given that prospective interference effects were 
obtained behaviorally in the two expectation conditions, which indicates according to 
the generally accepted line of reasoning that a PM intention was maintained in these 
experimental blocks. Yet, it is possible that, as participants prepared to, but did not 
actually have to switch between the PM and the ongoing task, monitoring processes 
declined over time, especially given the length of the blocks (~2 min). 
 
4.3.2 Reward Modulation of Prospective Memory 
 Concerning the hypothesized modulation of PM by reward expectations, we 
observed an increase in midbrain activation and activation in the putamen for PM 
associated with high, as compared to low reward. We did not observe a modulation of 
BA 10 activation by reward magnitude. However, we found a reward-related coupling 
between midbrain and anterior prefrontal cortex, as reflected in the observation of 
increased functional connectivity for high as compared to low reward. These results 
indicate that PM is not a purely cognitive phenomenon, but that motivational 
components of behavior can also be part of the PM system. 
 The behavioral data showed an effect of reward magnitude on the processing of PM 
cue trials, rather than on the ongoing task: participants responded faster to high reward 
compared to low reward PM cues. We did not observe a modulation of the prospective 
interference effect or the accuracy on ongoing trials by anticipated reward magnitude. 
However, concerning ongoing accuracy data, it needs to be stated that the prospective 
interference effect is usually observed in reaction times while leaving performance 
accuracy of the ongoing task relatively unaffected (Einstein, et al., 2005; Loft, et al., 
2008; Marsh, et al., 2003). Moreover, accuracy on PM cue trials did not differ in terms 
of reward magnitude, suggesting that participants were motivated to a similar extent by 
high and low rewards, presumably eliciting comparable interference effects in the 
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ongoing task. Thus, it cannot be fully resolved if the accuracy pattern found in the 
present data represents an insensitivity to reward magnitude in particular, or if accuracy 
on the ongoing task is generally unaffected by PM cue characteristics.  
 Supporting the conclusion that motivational processes play a role in PM, we found 
that individual levels of reward sensitivity (as measured using the BAS reward 
responsiveness self report scales) correlated with activation in midbrain areas for high 
rewarded PM cue trials.  
 Activation in dopaminergic midbrain areas, including the ventral tegmental area and 
the nucleus accumbens in the ventral striatum, have been previously associated with 
reward anticipation in tasks involving monetary rewards (Adcock, et al., 2006; 
D'Ardenne, et al., 2008; Schultz, 2006; Simon, et al., 2010; Wittmann, et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, reward-related activity in the midbrain and ventral striatum has been 
shown to be related to individual differences in reward responsiveness and approach 
motivation, most precisely BAS (Simon, et al., 2010), BAS reward responsiveness 
(Han, et al., 2010), and reward dependence as assessed with Cloninger’s Temperament 
and Character Inventory (Krebs, et al., 2009a). Like the ventral striatum, the dorsal 
striatum has been shown to be activated during the anticipation of primary or secondary 
rewards (Knutson, et al., 2001a; O'Doherty, et al., 2002). 
 Some studies have reported activation in BA 10 to be sensitive to monetary rewards 
and have accordingly proposed a role for this region in the monitoring of reward values 
(Pochon, et al., 2002; Ramnani & Miall, 2003). However, recent findings have 
suggested that the frontopolar cortex seems to be generally insensitive to absolute 
reward magnitude or to individual differences in reward responsiveness (Han, et al., 
2010), but rather responds to the coordination of two concurrent goals and their 
respective reward representations (Charron & Koechlin, 2010).  
 In line with these findings, we did not find a direct modulation of frontopolar activity 
by reward magnitude. Our functional connectivity analysis, however, revealed that 
increasing reward led to an increased coupling of the lateral frontopolar cortex with 
midbrain dopaminergic regions during PM, which was stronger for individuals showing 
a larger reward-related modulation of behavior. On the basis of these findings, we 
propose that, in the case of rewarded PM intentions, the frontopolar cortex has a general 
monitoring function, assuring that goals are met by maintaining delayed intentions. In 
addition, information about the value of these goals are relayed from dopaminergic 
5 Experiment 3 
 
 
54 
midbrain areas, which show an increase in connectivity to the frontopolar cortex when a 
high reward brings about a change in behavior. 
 In summary, our results confirm the role of the frontopolar cortex (BA 10) in the 
maintenance of prospective intentions and show that reward-related brain regions are 
sensitive to the magnitude of the expected reward conveyed by the prospective cues. In 
addition, we show that reward-related midbrain activity for PM cues varies with 
individual responsiveness to reward. Moreover, we report an increased functional 
coupling of the midbrain and frontopolar cortex under high reward PM context, which 
depends on reward modulations in PM performance. 
 Thus, our findings support the conclusion that processes assessing the motivational 
value of a prospective intention are involved in its maintenance and realization. 
 
5 Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 was designed to investigate potential differences in PM due to different 
kinds of incentive motivation. In experiment 2, we had varied the magnitude of 
monetary reward to elicit reward-related brain activation in the context of PM. 
However, in real-life PM situations, prospective intentions are not only used to achieve 
positive outcomes, but we also often try to avoid negative outcomes (e.g., although it 
might be highly unpleasant to remember to attend a dentist’s appointment, we have to 
do so in order to avoid even more unpleasant consequences). Thus, the anticipation of a 
reward and the opportunity to avoid losses are both directed at obtaining a positive 
outcome and might rely on partly overlapping motivational neural systems. Indeed, it 
has been reported that relief from pain is associated with neural activity in the midbrain 
and the amygdala, reflecting reward-learning signals (Seymour, et al., 2005). Moreover, 
Kim et al. (2006) could show that avoiding an aversive monetary outcome recruited the 
medial OFC, a region previously implicated in the evaluation of monetary reward, 
suggesting that the successful avoidance of a negative outcome is associated with 
positive affective valence and thus potentially represents an intrinsic reward signal.   
 Thus, experiment 3 was designed to extend findings from experiment 2 and to 
compare the effects of reward and loss avoidance in a PM context. Specifically, we set 
out to investigate if the kind of incentive motivation (reward or loss avoidance) 
associated with the PM intention would differentially affect PM related neural activity, 
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suggesting an interaction between the cognitive processes mediating PM and the 
motivational processes associated with the anticipation of a potential reward or with the 
avoidance of a loss.  
 As in experiment 1 and 2, we combined a PM paradigm with varying monetary 
incentives. In the reward conditions, the PM cues were associated with either a high or 
low monetary reward. In the loss conditions, PM cues were associated with the 
possibility to avoid or reduce a monetary loss.  
 We set out to investigate three issues: First, we were interested if activation and 
deactivation of the frontopolar cortex would be sensitive to the motivational context 
associated with the PM cue. Moreover, we investigated if brain regions usually 
responding to anticipated rewards and losses such as dopaminergic midbrain regions, 
the ventral striatum, and the amygdala, would encode information about reward and loss 
in the PM context. In particular, we were interested in the question if the anticipation of 
a higher positive net outcome would be associated with increasing activation in reward-
related regions, compared to a lower net outcome and differences between anticipation 
of a reward and the avoidance of a loss of the same size. We further set out to examine 
differences due to the magnitude of the anticipated reward and loss.  
 Secondly, we were interested in the question if brain regions such as the ventral 
striatum would be responsive to both stimulus contingencies (i.e., the PM/ongoing 
distinction) and incentive motivation (i.e., reward/loss). As loss avoidance has been 
suggested to rely, at least in part, on the same systems that respond to the anticipation 
and evaluation of reward, we intended to examine if the neural pattern associated with 
the avoidance of loss PM cues would involve these reward systems. Moreover, we were 
interested in the question if the interaction between the PM status and the kind of 
incentive motivation would be reflected in the activation pattern in this system.  
 Third, we examined if neural reward and loss avoidance effects on PM were 
modulated by individual differences in reward-related personality traits as measured by 
the BIS/BAS. 
 
5.1 Methods 
5.1.1 Participants 
 Twenty healthy right-handed volunteers participated in the study. All had normal or 
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corrected-to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric or neurological diseases. 
Informed consent was obtained according to a protocol approved by the local ethics 
committee. Participants were paid 15 Euro for their time. In addition, they received the 
amount individually earned in the experiment (cf. 5.1.2 for details about the payout 
rules). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to excessive movement 
artifacts. Thus, all behavioral and fMRI analyses reported here include data from 
nineteen participants (9 female; mean age 22.5 years, range 20 - 28 years).  
 
5.1.2 Experimental Paradigm 
 As in experiment 2, participants performed a 2-back version of the n-back task as the 
ongoing task (cf. Fig. 3.1). The basic experimental setup and trial timing were the same 
as in experiment 2 (see the description of the PM paradigm in section 4.1.2 for details).   
  The five following conditions were included here: PM high reward, PM low reward, 
PM loss reduction, PM loss avoidance and ongoing/baseline. Thus, the two expectation 
conditions in experiment 2 were replaced by the two PM loss conditions.  
 The payout rules were the following: in the PM conditions, participants could earn 
money or avoid losing money by correctly responding to the PM cues: in the high and 
low PM reward condition, participants earned 50 or 10 points, respectively, when they 
correctly responded to the PM cues. In these two conditions, they did not win (or lose) 
any points for missing PM cues. In the PM loss reduction condition, participants lost 10 
points for every PM cue that appeared, but only if they responded correctly. If their 
response was incorrect, they lost 50 points. Thus, participants could reduce the potential 
loss by correctly responding to the PM cues (i.e., -10 instead of -50 points). In the PM 
loss avoidance condition, participants could avoid losing points altogether by correctly 
detecting the PM cues. However, as in the loss reduction condition, 50 points were 
subtracted from their score for each missed PM cue (i.e., 0 instead of -50 points). We 
chose to match the absolute amounts that participants expected to win or lose in order to 
be able to directly compare reward to loss avoidance trials (i.e., the expectation of an 
outcome of +50 points compared to the avoidance of a 50 point loss), rather than to 
adjust the relative outcome differences for correct and incorrect answers within each 
kind of incentive motivation. This was done because experiment 1 and 2 had shown that 
accuracy on the PM task was very high and PM miss responses could not be analyzed 
due to low trial numbers.  
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 In order to prevent participants from ignoring the ongoing task in the presence of the 
more important PM cues, participants were informed that they always had to reach a 
criterion of at least 65% correct responses in the ongoing task for each block to be valid. 
Invalid blocks (i.e., accuracy on the ongoing task < 65%) resulted in the following 
payout changes: for each invalid block in the ongoing/baseline condition, 100 points 
were subtracted from the participant's total score. In the reward conditions, points 
earned in invalid blocks were not paid out (i.e., correct PM responses did not add to the 
total score). In the loss conditions, all PMs presented in invalid blocks were counted as 
errors (i.e., -50 points for every PM cue). For all participants, the start score was set to 
3000 points to allow for subtraction of points in the loss conditions. Points were 
converted at a ratio of 1 point = 0.5 Cents, with a maximum gain of 25 Euros (i.e., 50 
points = 25 Cents, 10 points = 5 Cents).      
 Information about the motivational incentive (i.e., the outcome for correct PM 
responses) was presented in the instruction at the beginning of each block (i.e., 50, 10, 0 
or -10) along with the PM stimulus (in the case of the ongoing/baseline condition, the 
word “2-back” along with a zero indicated that no points could be scored). In addition, a 
colored (i.e., gray, light green, dark green, light purple, dark purple) rectangle framing 
the instruction informed the participants about the motivational context of the block. 
This frame remained on the screen throughout each entire block. Color mappings were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 Overall, there were five blocks of each condition. Each of five scanner runs 
comprised five blocks (one of each condition) in random sequence. Participants 
completed 6 practice blocks consisting of 20 trials outside of the scanner (2 ongoing; 
one of each PM condition, comprising 3 PM cue trials each) and 4 practice blocks 
consisting of 40 trials inside the scanner (2 ongoing; 1 low reward, 1 loss avoidance, 6 
PM cue trials each), during the acquisition of the anatomical scans.   
 There were 40 PM cue trials in each of the PM conditions. The number of PM cues 
in each block varied between 4 and 12. The PM conditions included 160 ongoing trials 
(40 2-back targets and 120 2-back non-targets), resulting in a PM/ongoing trial ratio of 
25%. The ongoing/baseline condition comprised 150 2-back non-target and 50 2-back 
target trials to assure that the target/non-target ratio was the same in all conditions 
(~33%). The number of 2-back target trials per block varied between 6 and 10 in the PM 
and between 8 and 12 in the ongoing-baseline condition. 
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 Again, participants received feedback at the end of each block in two steps: the 
number of detected PM cues was presented in relation to the total number of PM cues 
present in this block, together with their percentage of correct responses on the ongoing 
trials. Next, the number of points that participants had scored in the current block was 
displayed together with the total cumulative score at this point in time. 
 
5.1.3 Questionnaires 
 Individual differences in the sensitivity of the behavioral approach and inhibition 
systems were assessed using the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994; cf. section 
3.1.3). For correlation analyses, parameter estimates were extracted from the activated 
brain regions and correlated with the BIS/BAS scores.  
 
5.1.4 Analysis of Behavioral Data 
 Reaction times were measured from the onset of the stimulus to the onset of the 
participant's response. Trials with incorrect or missing responses were excluded from 
the analysis of reaction times (and from fMRI analysis). Reaction times and percentages 
of correct responses were aggregated by participant and condition. For both reaction 
times and percentage correct responses on ongoing trials, we conducted repeated-
measures analyses of variance with the factors condition (5 levels) and trial-type (2 
levels), treating each experimental condition as a level of the factor 'condition'. We then 
performed post-hoc comparisons (using the Bonferroni correction as implemented in the 
PASW software package) between the different conditions. For PM cue trials, we 
conducted repeated-measures analyses of variance with the factors 'motivation' 
(reward/avoidance) and 'magnitude' (high/low). Post-hoc comparisons were used to test 
for differences between the levels of each factor. 
 
5.1.5 fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
 Hemodynamic responses were measured using a Siemens TimTrio 3T Scanner with a 
12-channel head coil. Foam cushions were used to minimize head movement. 32 
oblique axial slices (3 mm thickness, 1mm gap) were acquired using a T2*-weighted 
BOLD-sensitive gradient echo, echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE 
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= 30 ms, FOV = 192 mm, flip angle = 80°, in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm). The first 4 
images of each run were discarded to allow for stable magnetization. For coregistration, 
a T1 anatomical scan with the same slice prescription as the functional images was 
acquired. A high-resolution, structural T1-weighted MP-Rage scan was acquired after 
the functional scans. One participant was excluded due to excessive head-movement, 
leaving 19 participants for the final analysis. 
 All analyses were carried out with the Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). First, each 
participant's functional data set was slice-time and then motion-corrected. Data were 
spatially normalized into standard MNI atlas space (MNI 152), which involved also a 
resampling to voxel size 2 x 2 x 2 mm. Data were spatially smoothed with an 8 mm full-
width-half-maximum (FWHW) Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter of 1/192 Hz was 
used to remove low-frequency noise, and an AR(1) + white noise model corrected for 
temporal autocorrelation.  
 Random effects statistical analysis was undertaken using a mixed design to estimate 
sustained effects due to reward anticipation and the maintenance of the PM intention, 
and transient effects associated with the detection of the PM cues and with the 
processing of ongoing non-target and target trials.  
 Blocks lasted from the onset of the first trial until the end of the last trial of the block. 
Blocks of all conditions were modeled by convolving a boxcar function that had a 
specific onset and duration with a canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Instruction and feedback trials were modeled as regressors of no interest for each run. 
Transient effects were modeled using separate regressors for the three different trial 
types (ongoing: 2-back non-targets; ongoing: 2-back targets; PM cue trials) in each 
condition. Additionally, separate regressors coded for missed PM cue trials and for 
incorrect ongoing trials. Instruction and feedback trials were modeled as two additional 
regressors.  
 Subject-specific estimates for the contrasts of interest were obtained using linear 
contrasts across sessions.  These estimates were entered into the second stage of 
analysis treating subjects as random effects, using a one-sample t-test across subjects. 
Statistical parametric maps of the contrasts of interest were constructed.  
 Anatomical masks taken from the same set as in experiment 2 were used for ROI 
analyses (the only difference being that here, the original anatomical masks were used 
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without constraining the search space by means of functional activation). More 
specifically, in order to test explicitly the involvement of reward related brain regions, 
we used anatomical masks of the midbrain, as defined by the Talairach Daemon Labels 
Masks (WFU pickatlas; Lancaster, et al., 1997; Lancaster, et al., 2000; Maldjian, et al., 
2003). For an explorative analysis of the amygdala, an Automated Anatomical Labeling 
(AAL) mask from the same set was used (Tzourio-Mazoyer, et al., 2002).  
 Additionally, we constructed two functionally defined regions of interest in the 
frontopolar cortex to assess potential modulations of incentive motivation in this region.  
Functional activation was restricted by a structural mask of BA 10 (taken from the same 
set as the midbrain mask) which was dilated in 3-dimensional space by a factor of 1 
voxel in order to ensure complete masking of frontopolar gyri. For block analyses, this 
resulted in four activation foci from the ongoing vs. PM block contrast which comprised 
medial parts of the frontopolar cortex, while the ROI that was defined by the PM cues 
vs. ongoing trials contrast included medial and lateral parts of the frontopolar cortex. 
 As our data did not allow for anatomical localization of the nucleus accumbens or the 
ventral striatum based on each individual’s structural scan, we used an anatomical voxel 
mask retrieved from a publication-based probabilistic MNI atlas as a binary mask at the 
threshold of .50 to define the region of interest in the ventral striatum (Nielsen & 
Hansen, 2002, please refer to http://neuro.imm.dtu.dk/services/jerne/ninf/voi/index-
alphabetic.html, access date June 2010).  
 To protect against false positive activations, we used a double-threshold approach 
that involves combining a voxel-based threshold with a minimum cluster size (Forman, 
et al., 1995). This nonarbitrary cluster size was determined on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulation (1000 iterations) determined with AFNI’s AlphaSim tool (Ward, 2000; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). For all five ROIs, we determined the minimal cluster size 
for an individual voxel height threshold of T > 2.88 (p < 0.005, uncorrected) to ensure 
an overall image-wise false positive rate of 5%. This resulted in the following cluster 
size thresholds: midbrain: 34; amygdala: 12; ventral striatum: 20; frontopolar (block): 
21; frontopolar (event): 41. An additional Monte Carlo simulation (1,000 iterations) was 
conducted to determine cluster size thresholds for whole brain analyses. This yielded a 
cluster size of 148 voxels. Activations exceeding this threshold are considered to be 
activated at an experiment-wise threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons. 
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 The specific pattern of the effect of incentive motivation as well as the modulation of 
PM trial status by incentive motivation was examined by extracting mean parameter 
estimates from the beta images that were calculated during model estimation of the 
original general linear model, and by subjecting these to further analyses using standard 
statistical software (PASW 18.0). 
 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Behavioral Results 
 Participants’ ongoing accuracy exceeded 65% at all times. Thus, all five blocks in 
each condition were included in the behavioral (and fMRI) analyses reported here.  
 As in experiments 1 and 2, participants' performance at the ongoing 2-back task was 
very high, i.e., 94% for non-targets and 72% for targets (Table 5.1). An interaction 
between the factors condition and trial type [F(4,72) = 6.04; p < 0.001] indicated that 
accuracy on targets vs. non-targets of the 2-back task was potentially affected 
differentially by the presence of a PM intention and the associated reward or loss. 
 Thus, we conducted separate analyses for non-targets and targets: for non-target 
trials, there was no effect of condition (p > 0.786). An effect of condition on target trials 
[F(4,72) = 6.157; p < 0.001] indicated that accuracy on target trials was lower in the low 
reward and both loss conditions compared to the ongoing/baseline condition (all ps < 
0.028). Accuracy in the high reward condition did not differ from accuracy in the 
ongoing/baseline condition (p = 0.314). There was no significant difference in accuracy 
between any of the other conditions. 
 Accuracy on PM trials did not differ with respect to incentive (i.e., reward or loss) or 
magnitude (i.e., high or low). 
 For reaction times, an interaction between the factors condition and trial type 
[F(4,72) = 5.69; p = 0.001] indicated that the effect of trial-type was modulated by 
incentive condition. Again, we conducted separate analyses for non-target and target 
trials: we found a main effect for the factor condition on non-target trials [F(4,72) = 
25.6; p < 0.001]. Pairwise comparisons revealed prospective interference effects (i.e., 
longer reaction times for the PM, compared to the ongoing/baseline condition) for all 
PM conditions (all ps < 0.001), but there was no difference between either of the PM 
conditions (all ps > 0.28). The same pattern was found for target trials: a prospective 
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interference effect was present in all PM conditions [main effect condition: F(4,72) = 
17.56; p < 0.001; all ps < 0.001]. Reaction times did not differ between the PM 
conditions (all ps > 0.18). 
  
Table 5.1: Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracy (% correct) for ongoing trials (non-targets 
and targets) in all conditions and for PM cues in reward and loss avoidance conditions. Standard 
error of the mean is given in parentheses. 
 
  Non-targets Targets PM cues 
 
Reward  
                    
             high 
                   
 
 
 
RT (SE) 
 
 
585.26 (19.02) 611.37 (20.04) 585.11 (16.79) 
Acc (SE) 93.41 (1.73) 
 
73.16 (3.59) 87.76 (2.47) 
             low  578.79 (17.95) 608.11 (18.66) 608.11 (13.95) 
 93.61 (1.22) 70.52 (3.64) 87.86 (1.95) 
Loss  
 
             reduce 
  
 
576.26 (19.02) 617.79 (19.81) 597.53 (14.13) 
 93.41 (1.17) 
 
71.02 (3.48) 86.97 (2.31) 
             avoid  577.0 (17.48) 638.79 (17.69) 603.79 (12.71) 
 94.32 (0.91) 
 
72.12 (2.91) 
 
85.92 (2.5) 
 
Ongoing/baseline 
  
534.63 (19.04) 565.74 (17.38) 
 
- 
 93.81 (0.85) 79.56 (3.43) - 
 
For PM cue trials, an interaction between the factors incentive and magnitude was 
found [F(1,18) = 5.22; p = 0.035]. Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that while 
participants responded significantly faster to high reward, compared to low reward PM 
cue trials [t(18) = -3.56; p = 0.002], the difference between PM cues associated with 
loss reduction and avoidance was not significant (p = 0.266). Response times did not 
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differ for reward and loss PM cues, collapsed across incentive magnitude (p = 0.445). 
 Correlation analyses with the BIS/BAS scores revealed that PM accuracy difference 
scores for high and low reward correlated negatively with the BIS score [r = -.57, p = 
.011]. Thus, individuals with low BIS scores performed better on high compared to low 
reward PM cue trials. 
 
5.2.2 fMRI Results 
 We analysed the fMRI data with regard to four different aspects. First, we aimed at 
examining the involvement of BA 10 in sustained and transient processes in PM. 
Second, we analyzed potential effects of incentive motivation, irrespective of incentive 
magnitude, thus contrasting effects of reward and loss avoidance. Third, we were 
interested in the interaction of incentive motivation and magnitude. Fourth, we explored 
potential effects of the interaction between PM trial status and incentive motivation. In 
the case of the first three types of analyses, results of both block and event-related data 
are reported, while the fourth analysis required a differentiation of trial types and thus 
included only event-related data.  
 
5.2.2.1 Sustained and Transient Activation of the Frontopolar Cortex  
 In order to replicate previous findings of BA 10 in prospective memory, our first 
analyses aimed at comparing sustained activation in PM and ongoing/baseline 
conditions, irrespective of incentive motivation. Consistent with earlier studies, we 
found deactivation of medial BA 10 in the PM conditions, compared to the 
ongoing/baseline conditions on the whole brain level (Table 5.2).  
 Analyses of transient activity based on the comparison between PM cues and 
ongoing trials of the same conditions revealed activation in a large cortical network, 
including medial and lateral parts of BA 10, extending laterally into the superior frontal 
gyrus and medially into the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Moreover, we found a 
large activation focus in the precuneus, extending ventrally into the posterior cingulate 
gyrus. In addition, we observed activation in the thalamus, extending into the caudate 
nucleus and putamen, as well as into the parahippocampal gyrus and the midbrain (Fig. 
5.1, Table 5.3).  
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Figure 5.1: Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized 
structural images of the study participants. Activation in BA 10 in the contrast of PM vs. 
ongoing (non-target and target) trials, collapsed across reward and loss avoidance. For 
illustration purposes, images are thresholded at p < .001, k > 15. 
 
 
Table 5.2: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations in regions showing 
a decrease in sustained activation during PM, compared to ongoing blocks.  
 
 
 
Peak voxel (in 
mm) 
  
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value cluster 
size 
Frontal       
Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10) L -14  58 16 5.75 361 
Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10) R 14 60 4 4.92 875 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(BA 46) 
R 46 46 10 5.20 302 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 
46/47) 
L -50 36 14 5.03 289 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (BA 
32/10) 
L -14 30 -8 6.30 172 
Temporal       
Occipitotemporal Cortex R 56 -70 2 6.26 266 
Occipitotemporal Cortex L -60 -62 4 4.73 394 
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Table 5.3: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations in regions showing 
an increase in transient activation during PM cues (reward+loss), compared to ongoing trials 
from the same conditions.  
 
 
 
Peak voxel (in 
mm) 
  
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value cluster 
size1 
Frontal       
Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) R 20  4 70 6.22 239 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 
6/32) 
R 20  8 52 5.21 80 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(BA 9) 
R 50 24 38 6.39 442 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(BA 9) 
L -56 6 38 4.85 32 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 6/8) L -46 8 50 5.24 35 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 6/8) R 12 0 54 4.39 26 
Medial Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) R 8 -14 64 5.29 62 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 
44/45) 
R 58 16 22 6.27 257 
Parietal       
Precuneus (BA 7) L -42 -34 54 11.7 49541 
Temporal       
Perirhinal Cortex (BA 35) R 20 -24 -18 4.66 16 
Basal Ganglia       
Ventral Striatum L -14 10 0 5.09 79 
Other       
Cerebellum L -44 -66 -44 5.45 27 
1For a more precise localization of the activation sites in this contrast, the whole brain threshold 
was set to p < 0.001, uncorrected, with a cluster size of k > 15. 
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5.2.2.2 Effects of Reward vs. Loss Avoidance 
 In a first step, we set out to investigate if PM maintenance and cue detection was 
modulated by motivational incentive (i.e., reward or loss), independent of reward 
magnitude.  
 The direct comparison of reward and loss blocks in BA 10 did not yield a significant 
result. ROI analyses of transient activity in BA 10 for ongoing trials (non-targets and 
targets) in the PM conditions confirmed the block analyses. However, ongoing trials in 
the reward, but not in the loss conditions revealed significantly greater activation when 
compared to the ongoing/baseline condition (x = 10, y = 44, z = -12; T = 5.26; k = 57). 
 We did not find differential activation for reward, compared to loss blocks, in the 
midbrain ROI. Analyses of transient activation for reward vs. loss PM cues confirmed 
the block results: both reward and loss PM cues led to an increase in midbrain activation 
when compared to the respective ongoing trials, but did not show any differences in this 
midbrain ROI when compared directly. ROI analyses in the ventral striatum did not lead 
to significant results on the block level or when PM cues were compared directly. 
 The whole brain analysis showed two significant activation clusters for the reward 
vs. loss block contrast in the middle temporal (including the amygdala as well as the 
parahippocampal gyrus) and inferior temporal/middle occipital gyrus (x = -32, y = 0, z 
= -26; T = 5.64; k = 210 and x = 50, y = -66, z = -8; T = 4.62; k = 239, respectively), 
while the reverse contrast revealed an activation cluster in the precentral gyrus (x = 64, 
y = -12, z = 24; T = 5.41, k = 343). Comparisons of reward and loss PM cues did not 
reveal significant results. 
 Accordingly, the ROI analysis in the amygdala revealed increased activation in 
reward, compared to loss blocks (x = -30, y = 0, z = -26; T = 4.85; k = 15). This 
modulation was however not reflected in differences in transient activity in response to 
the outcomes, i.e., reward vs. loss PM cue hits. 
   
5.2.2.3 Interaction of Incentive Motivation and Magnitude  
 In the next step, we aimed at investigating potential differences due to the size of the 
incentive by including information about the amount of the potential gain/loss 
avoidance in the analyses.  
 Midbrain areas showed a response profile sensitive to the interaction of incentive 
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motivation and magnitude (x = 20, y = -20, z = -4; T = 5.77; k = 48) (Fig. 5.2). On the 
whole brain level, these midbrain activations were accompanied by an incentive type x 
magnitude interaction in the superior temporal cortex/temporal pole, bilaterally, and in 
the occipital cortex (Table 5.4). Activation in the regions of interest in the ventral 
striatum, the amygdala, and BA 10 was not sensitive to this interaction.  
 To resolve this interaction, we next analyzed both kinds of incentive motivation 
separately, comparing high to low reward blocks, and loss avoidance to loss reduction 
blocks in the midbrain. High reward blocks led to greater activation of midbrain regions 
compared to low reward blocks (x = 12, y = -16, z = -14; T = 4.47; k = 44), while no 
such difference was found for loss avoidance, compared to loss reduction blocks or the 
reverse contrast (Fig. 5.2 b)).   
 Interestingly, the activation difference for high, compared to low reward PM cues in 
this midbrain region correlated significantly with response time differences for high and 
low reward PM cues [r = -.49, p = 0.034], suggesting that an increase in reward-related 
midbrain activation was associated with faster response times for high, compared to low 
reward (Fig. 5.2 c)). 
 In order to investigate if reward and loss avoidance differ in the degree of reward 
anticipation associated with a positive outcome (i.e., the receipt of a reward or the 
avoidance of a loss), we directly compared sustained activation for high reward vs. loss 
avoidance (i.e., the gain of 50 points vs. the avoidance of a loss of 50 points). We did 
not find any differences in sustained activation in the midbrain ROI for high reward 
compared to loss avoidance, or the reverse contrast. The amygdala showed increased 
activation in response to high reward, compared to loss avoidance (x = 32, y = -2, z = -
24; T = 3.7; k = 23), but no such difference was found in the BA 10 and ventral striatum 
ROIs. No activation differences were found for high reward PM, compared to loss 
avoidance PM cues in the regions of interest in the midbrain, amygdala, ventral striatum 
or BA 10. 
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Figure 5.2: Activation in the midbrain for the effect of the net positive outcome across blocks 
(i.e., collapsed across high reward and loss avoidance blocks, compared to low reward and loss 
reduction blocks). Group functional activation maps are overlaid on the shapes of the 
anatomical ROIs depicted in red (a). Parameter estimates for reward and loss blocks: midbrain 
activation is increased for high, compared to low reward blocks (b). The increase in midbrain 
activation for high reward PM cues is associated with faster response times for high reward PM 
cues (c). Parameter estimates in (b) and (c) are extracted from the peak activation in the high vs. 
low reward block contrast.  
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Table 5.4: MNI coordinates and anatomical location of the peak activations in regions showing 
increased activation during anticipation of a high positive outcome (i.e., high reward and loss 
avoidance blocks compared to low reward and loss reduction blocks). 
 
  
Peak voxel (in 
mm)   
Brain region Hemi. x y z t-value cluster 
size 
Parietal       
Cingulate Gyrus (BA 31/5) R 16 -32 46 5.67 245 
Temporal       
Temporal Pole (BA 38) R 52 6 -16 8.08 193 
Occipital       
Cuneus (BA 18) R 14 -52 -10 4.65 648 
Cuneus (BA 19) R 18 -76 30 4.10 543 
 
 
5.2.2.4 Interaction of PM Status and Incentive Motivation 
 In an explorative analysis, we were interested in the neural mechanisms supporting 
the interaction between the trial status of a specific item (i.e., the PM/ongoing 
distinction) and the incentive motivation (i.e., reward/loss). ROI results revealed that, in 
the right ventral striatum, there was a trend towards a significant response pattern 
encoding this interaction. In order to increase the sensitivity of the analyses, we focused 
our analyses to the ROI of the right ventral striatum, using a binary mask derived from a 
probabilistic mask atlas (cf. Methods section). This analysis confirmed that activation in 
the ventral striatum encoded the interaction between the PM status and incentive 
motivation (x = 16, y = 12, z = 0; T = 3.79; k = 14) (Fig 5.3 a)). The whole-brain 
analyses confirmed the activation focus in the right ventral striatum, but this activation 
did not survive the whole brain cluster threshold (x = 18, y = 16, z = 0; T = 3.81; k = 
28). The regions of interest in the amygdala, midbrain, and BA 10 were not responsive 
to this interaction.  
 To follow up this interaction in the ventral striatum, parameter estimates were 
extracted for each subject, separately for reward and loss PM and ongoing trials, 
collapsed across incentive magnitude. Paired t-tests revealed that in the loss, but not 
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reward conditions, parameter estimates were increased for PM, compared to ongoing 
cues [loss: t(18) = 5.08; p < 0.001; reward: p = 0.72]. Moreover, ongoing reward trials 
exhibited increased activity compared to ongoing loss trials [t(18) = -3.12; p = 0.006] 
(Fig 5.3 b)). 
 Interestingly, individual differences in reward responsiveness correlated positively 
with activation differences in this region for reward, compared to loss avoidance PM 
cues [r = .50; p = 0.03] (Fig 5.3 c)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Activation in the right ventral striatum encodes the interaction between 
PM/ongoing and reward/loss (a). Group functional activation maps are overlaid on the shapes of 
the ROI depicted in red. Parameter estimates differ for loss, but not reward PM and ongoing 
trials (b).The difference in activation between reward and loss PM cue trials correlates with 
scores on the BAS reward responsiveness scale (c). Parameter estimates in (b) and (c) were 
extracted from the peak activation in the ventral striatum. 
 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 The intention of experiment 3 was to investigate the neural effects of different kinds 
of motivational incentives on the maintenance and retrieval of prospective intentions. 
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Using fMRI, we combined a PM paradigm with monetary rewards and losses.  
 We replicated previous findings by showing that the maintenance of a PM intention 
is reflected in the deactivation of medial frontopolar cortex (BA 10). Importantly, we 
observed a modulation of reward-related midbrain regions reflecting the anticipation of 
a net positive outcome (obtain reward or avoid loss), while amygdala regions coded the 
intensity of the expected outcome, which was highest when a high reward was expected.  
 Moreover, ventral striatal activity encoded the interaction between PM status and 
incentive motivation, extending the previous implications of this region in reward-
related behavior to a role in motivated prospective remembering.  
 
5.3.1 The Role of the Frontopolar Cortex in Prospective Memory 
 In experiment 3, we replicated previous findings that implicate the frontopolar cortex 
in intact prospective memory functioning. Specifically, our results show a sustained 
deactivation of the medial frontopolar cortex for the PM, compared to the ongoing 
context. While these results are in accordance with findings from earlier studies 
(Burgess, et al., 2001; Burgess, et al., 2003), they differ from experiment 2, in which we 
did not find this pattern of results. One possible reason is the inclusion of PM 
expectation blocks in experiment 2, which could have resulted in a loss of statistical 
power, compared to experiment 3, in which only PM execution blocks were included. 
 We further show that medial and lateral parts of BA 10 are more active for PM, 
compared to ongoing trials and herewith replicate the activation pattern found in 
experiment 2. We thus extend previous findings in terms of a role of frontopolar cortex 
in switching between externally and internally oriented processes (Gilbert, et al., 2005).  
 We did not find the activity in the frontopolar cortex to be modulated by different 
kinds of reward or rewards of increasing magnitude. This pattern of results is in line 
with hierarchical models of anterior prefrontal cortex functioning and with recent 
evidence suggesting a more general role of the frontopolar cortex in the processing of 
reward-related information: while earlier studies have implicated this region in the 
integration of reward information into cognitive processes per se (Pochon, et al., 2002), 
recent studies have suggested that the frontopolar cortex is only involved in combining 
rewards from two tasks, but not in response to rewards associated with a specific task 
alone (Charron & Koechlin, 2010). Based on the results of the present study, we 
hypothesize that in PM, the frontopolar cortex prim
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between the PM and the ongoing task, while other, reward-related brain regions, process 
information about the motivational value of each specific task. 
 
5.3.2 Effects of Incentive Motivation 
 We observed differential midbrain activation related to variations in the net outcome 
of PM cues: blocks comprising high reward and loss avoidance PM cues showed an 
increase in sustained activation in midbrain regions compared to blocks with low 
reward or loss reduction PM cues. Thus, midbrain areas seemed to code the prospect of 
achieving the highest relative outcome. In particular, sustained activation in this region 
showed an increase for high, compared to low reward, as has been found for the 
anticipation of monetary gains (McKell Carter, et al., 2009), while the avoidance, 
compared to the reduction of a loss, did not give rise to increased midbrain activation. 
 Importantly, we found midbrain activation differences for high vs. low reward PM 
cues to correlate with response time differences for those cues, indicating that higher 
levels of midbrain activation as a result of high reward expectation were directly linked 
to reward modulations in behavior. Previous research has shown that high reward can be 
associated with higher accuracy or faster response times to cued targets and gives rise to 
an increase in activation in reward-related regions such as the ventral striatum (Knutson, 
et al., 2001b; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003; Simon, et al., 2010). 
Here, we show that midbrain activation reflects differences in incentive motivation of 
PM cues. Moreover, our results indicate that these activation differences are directly 
related to the behavioral response to the differently rewarded PM cues, demonstrating a 
crucial link between the reward modulation of events in the context of PM and the 
differential activity of the underlying reward system.  
 We did not find a difference between high reward and the avoidance of a loss of the 
same size in the midbrain. Prospect theory implies that losses have a larger impact than 
gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The reverse however, does not seem to explain the 
data in the present study: the possibility of avoiding a loss did not elicit higher BOLD 
responses in areas related to reward anticipation than the possibility of obtaining a 
reward of the same size.  
 We found the amygdala to be differentially involved in the processing of the 
motivational information conveyed by the PM cues. We observed higher sustained 
activation in the amygdala for reward than for loss avoidance blocks, and activity in this 
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region also differentiated between high and low reward. Although the amygdala has 
long been associated with fear conditioning in the context of emotional learning, 
evidence from studies in non-human primates and in humans suggest a role in the 
processing positive reward signals (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Hommer, et al., 2003; 
Murray, 2007). In particular, it has been proposed that the amygdala contributes to both 
positive and negative affect, by mediating a general arousing effect of reward (Anderson 
& Sobel, 2003; Murray, 2007) and to contribute (in concert with the orbitofrontal 
cortex) to goal-directed behavior by representing the value of an upcoming reward 
(Gottfried, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; Hampton, Adolphs, Tyszka, & O'Doherty, 2007). 
Amygdala activation in combination with activation of midbrain areas has also been 
reported to code appetitive prediction errors in humans during reward- and loss-driven 
reinforcement learning (Seymour, et al., 2005). In the present study, amygdala 
activation was enhanced when reward anticipation was high. Given that amygdala 
activation reflects a general arousing effect of incentive motivation, it can be assumed 
that the prospect of receiving a high reward was perceived as more intense than 
receiving a low reward or being able to avoid financial loss. The behavioral data are in 
agreement with this view, showing faster response times for high reward PM cues. 
Moreover, accuracy on ongoing target trials decreased in all conditions compared to 
ongoing/baseline, except under high reward. Thus, when a high reward was at stake, 
this detrimental effect of the PM monitoring process on ongoing accuracy seemed to be 
canceled out by a general effect of enhanced attention to specific outcome-related trials.
   
5.3.3 Encoding of Incentive Motivation and PM status 
 We found that only the ventral striatal region encoded the interaction between the 
PM status and the motivational incentive. The nucleus accumbens and ventral striatal 
regions in general have been associated with the anticipation and outcome of monetary 
reward (Knutson, et al., 2001a; Knutson, et al., 2001b; Simon, et al., 2010). However, 
conflicting evidence exists concerning loss-related activations. While some studies have 
reported decreases in ventral striatal activation or distinct spatial loci for losses (Breiter, 
Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Robinson, et al., 2010; Seymour, et al., 
2007; Tom, et al., 2007; Yacubian, et al., 2006), other studies have reported activations 
in reward-related regions (Cooper & Knutson, 2008; McKell Carter, et al., 2009). 
Cooper and Knutson (2008) cued participants to anticipate monetary gains and losses 
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that were either certain or uncertain (i.e., were independent of or did depend on 
participants' response speed). For certain outcomes, the activation of nucleus accumbens 
increased for anticipated gains and decreased for anticipated losses. For uncertain 
outcomes, however, activity increased for both monetary gains and losses and did not 
differ between them, suggesting that both the valence (gain or loss) and the salience 
(certain or uncertain) contributed to the activation of the nucleus accumbens in response 
to monetary reward.  
 Here, we extend these findings by showing that activation in the ventral striatum, 
encompassing the nucleus accumbens, is differentially modulated by incentive 
motivation and PM status. In particular, activity in this region was higher during reward, 
compared to loss avoidance ongoing trials, which we take to reflect the reward 
anticipation associated with the motivational context and a higher motivational salience 
of reward, compared to loss avoidance. Importantly, this region also seemed to encode 
differences in the PM status (PM vs. ongoing), which were more pronounced for loss 
trials. PM, relative to ongoing trials, can be considered to be more salient due to 
outcome contingencies. Thus, these findings fit well with an account of nucleus 
accumbens being implicated in the processing of valence and salience features of a 
stimulus: during reward ongoing trials, the anticipation of a positive outcome is higher 
than during loss avoidance ongoing trials. On the other hand, under loss, compared to 
reward conditions, PM cues might be more salient due to their aversive characteristics, 
thus giving rise to a larger PM-ongoing activation difference. 
 We found that activation differences in the ventral striatal region for reward and loss 
avoidance significantly correlated with individual reward responsiveness. Reward-
related activity in the ventral striatum has been shown to be related to individual 
differences in reward responsiveness and approach motivation (Han, et al., 2010; Krebs, 
et al., 2009a; Simon, et al., 2010). In particular, individual reward sensitivity has been 
reported to predict differential activation in the nucleus accumbens for the relative 
difference between gains and losses, suggesting that responses in these regions are 
primarily sensitive to aspects of motivational salience, but can be modulated by 
affective valence, especially in highly reward sensitive individuals (McKell Carter, et 
al., 2009). Here, we extend these findings by showing that PM cues fulfill the 
characteristics of motivational salience and that individual reward responsiveness is 
reflected in BOLD responses to the valence of the PM cues. 
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6 Summary and General Discussion 
6.1 Behavioral Data 
 In all 3 experiments, costs on the ongoing task (i.e., longer response latencies for 
ongoing trials in PM, compared to ongoing/baseline conditions) were found. If these 
costs do indeed reflect the maintenance of a PM intention or strategic monitoring 
processes as the literature suggests, we can in turn assume that prospective intentions 
were maintained in each of our 3 experiments.  
 Concerning a modulation of behavior by the motivational context, the results 
revealed that accuracy as well as response times were affected by the kind of incentive 
motivation and the size of the incentive.  
 Consistently across the three experiments, we found that accuracy on PM trials was 
not affected by motivational incentive or magnitude. Instead, accuracy on the ongoing 
task, in particular, on 2-back target trials, was differentially affected by reward. This is 
perhaps not surprising for the following reasons: participants could lose money by 
missing PM cues. On the other hand, they would only forfeit this extra money if 
accuracy on the ongoing task dropped below 60% (65% in experiment 3). Thus, it is 
highly probable that participants sacrificed some degree of accuracy on the ongoing task 
in order to succeed on the PM task, which is apparent in the high levels of accuracy for 
PM cues. The fact that a modulation of accuracy by incentive was only found on target 
trials, which were the more difficult trial types, supports this view. 
 While in experiment 2, accuracy on target trials in both the high and low reward 
condition was lower than in the ongoing/baseline condition (most probably as a result of 
the interference with PM cue detection processes), experiment 1 and 3 showed 
somewhat contradictory findings: in experiment 1, accuracy on target trials in the high 
reward condition was lower than in the ongoing/baseline condition, but in experiment 3, 
accuracy did not differ in these two conditions (while accuracy in all other incentive 
conditions was lower than ongoing/baseline accuracy). One possible explanation for this 
is that different kinds of motivational incentives were used in experiment 3 (reward and 
loss), compared to only one (reward) in experiment 1. Thus, subjective evaluation 
differences between these incentives could account for the different findings in 
experiment 1 and 3 (e.g., a high reward could appear even more rewarding compared to 
the avoidance of a loss, while this is not the case if it is only compared to a low reward). 
 We found a clear effect of reward on response times in experiment 2 and 3: response 
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times to PM cues were faster when participants expected a high, compared to a low 
reward. Based on the fact that faster response times for high reward targets have been 
found in simple reaction time tasks such as the MID task (as was also the case in our 
localizer task), where a direct stimulus-response mapping was implemented, it can be 
assumed that, in our PM task, participants directly related the incentive to the PM 
stimulus. In addition, they seemed to be more attentive if they expected a high reward. 
 Taken together, it seems that incentive effects on PM are primarily found in response 
times to the PM cues rather than on the costs on the ongoing task. In addition, accuracy 
on the ongoing task can increase or decrease in the presence of PM-related rewards, 
presumably reflecting the amount of attention that is allocated to the ongoing task 
according to the evaluation of the incentive motivation. 
 Another important factor that was in the focus of our investigations was the potential 
effect of individual differences on the processing of reward in the context of PM. On the 
basis of Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory which proposes a biological model of 
personality based on individual approach and avoidance behavior, we expected 
individual differences to have an impact on reward-related modulations of behavior. We 
found substantial inter-individual variability in reward-related accuracy and response 
time differences in all 3 experiments, thus accounting for the investigation of individual 
personality variables. Accordingly, we found both neuroticism and conscientiousness to 
prevent decreases in accuracy in the ongoing task caused by the reward associated with 
the PM cues. Furthermore, in line with previous findings of correlations between 
individual differences in self-reported behavioral approach and avoidance measures and 
neural responses to reward (Krebs, et al., 2009a; Simon, et al., 2010), we found that 
approach and avoidance behavior based on reward expectations is directly related to PM 
performance. Thus, here we show that individual differences in approach and avoidance 
behavior are important in understanding the link between biological and behavioral 
effects of reward and must be taken into account when reward-related modulations of 
behavior in PM are investigated.   
 
6.2 fMRI Data 
 In two fMRI experiments, we investigated the effect of incentive motivation on the 
neural mechanisms supporting PM. While experiment 2 was designed to examine the 
effects of different levels of reward on PM, experiment 3 aimed at extending findings 
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from experiment 2 by varying the kind of incentive motivation, comparing reward 
anticipation and loss avoidance motivation in PM.  
 
6.2.1 The Role of the Frontopolar Cortex in Prospective Memory  
 In experiment 3, we replicated previous findings of a sustained deactivation of the 
medial frontopolar cortex during the PM, compared to the ongoing tasks (Burgess, et 
al., 2003). Generally, this sustained medial frontopolar deactivation has been associated 
with the processing of internal, compared to external information. In the PM context, 
this pattern of results has been associated with the maintenance of the prospective 
intention, in particular, with the monitoring for PM cues (Burgess, et al., 2003; Gilbert, 
et al., 2005). In experiment 2, we did not find the frontopolar cortex to be differentially 
activated in response to PM (execution and expectation) vs. ongoing blocks. Two 
potential reasons can account for this: first, the PM expectation condition did not 
contain any PM trials, which might have led to reduced maintenance/monitoring. For 
this explanation to be valid, the comparison between PM execution and ongoing blocks 
should still have given rise to an increase in BA 10 activation, because PM cues were 
present in this condition. However, neither PM expectation nor execution conditions led 
to an increase in BA 10 activation when compared to the ongoing/baseline condition. 
Thus, an explanation in terms of reduced maintenance processes is unlikely.   
 Second, for the above reason, experiment 2 only comprised half of the number of PM 
cues compared to experiment 3, which might have led to a lack of statistical power. 
Indeed, lowering the statistical threshold to p = 0.01 revealed a small activation cluster 
in medial BA 10 for the ongoing vs. expectation and execution comparison. 
 In both experiment 2 and 3, we observed activation of the frontopolar cortex in 
response to the PM cues. In both cases, PM cues, compared to ongoing trials, gave rise 
to an increased BOLD response in the medial and lateral parts of BA 10. On the basis of 
the findings of Gilbert et al. (2005), we hypothesize that activity on PM cue trials 
reflects the switching from the ongoing towards the PM task. As mentioned above, the 
medial deactivation of the frontopolar cortex on the block level is generally interpreted 
as a disengagement from the ongoing activity. In turn, activation of this area could 
reflect the fact that some degree of attention was still directed at the ongoing task, 
presumably due to the function of the PM cue trials in the 2-back rhythm. 
 While we did not find sustained or transient activation in BA 10 to be modulated by 
6 Summary and General Discussion 
 
 
78 
reward magnitude (experiment 2) or variations of incentive motivation and magnitude 
(experiment 3), we found that lateral parts of BA 10 showed increased connectivity with 
the midbrain under high, compared to low reward conditions and reward-related 
performance increases. The lack of a reward effect in BA 10 is in line with recent 
findings claiming that activation in the frontopolar cortex is not dependent on reward 
per se, but rather responds to the joint increase of two separately rewarded tasks 
(Charron & Koechlin, 2010; Tsujimoto, et al., 2010). In particular, a study using single-
cell recordings in two behaving monkeys found that cells in the frontopolar cortex 
encoded the monkey’s decision at the time of feedback, but were not responsive to 
reward anticipation when the reward served as a cue (Tsujimoto, et al., 2010). Although 
there are several caveats in terms of location and cytoarchitecture when comparing brain 
areas and subdivisions in humans and rhesus monkeys, this study suggests that the 
frontopolar cortex monitors decisions made in the context of correct task performance, 
but does not encode reward information per se. Moreover, in humans, frontopolar cortex 
has shown to be responsive to the integration of reward information from two combined 
cognitive tasks, but not to each reward information separately (Charron & Koechlin, 
2010). In light of these findings, the present data suggest that the frontopolar cortex is 
not responsive to the magnitude of the reward information conveyed by the PM cues, 
but that it monitors the shifting process between the PM and the ongoing task. In this 
function, it seems to receive information about the reward value of the PM task from 
midbrain areas mediating information about the reward at stake. This connection seems 
to be increasingly stronger when a high reward is at stake, suggesting that in the case of 
highly motivated cognitive goals, these brain regions work “in tune” to assure that a 
successful outcome is achieved and is repeated in the future. 
 
6.2.2 Effects of Incentive Motivation in Prospective Memory 
 In both experiments 2 and 3, we found that high reward anticipation led to an 
increase in sustained activation in the midbrain. Activity on PM and ongoing trials, 
however, did not differ with respect to reward magnitude, suggesting that it was the 
anticipation of high rewards associated with the outcome of both the PM and ongoing 
task that led to an increase in midbrain activation levels. Activity in the midbrain has 
been reported to increase with high reward anticipation, especially under high 
probabilities (Knutson, et al., 2005). In our study, the probability of earning the reward 
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depended on the participants’ response to the unpredictable occurrence of PM cues, 
independent of the reward context. Moreover, although the emphasis was on the PM 
cues, both PM and ongoing task performance contributed to the prospect of earning the 
reward. However, while above-criterion ongoing task performance only ensured 
participants the receipt of any reward (instead of no reward at all), the magnitude of the 
reward was closely linked to PM performance. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
information about the magnitude of the potential reward was maintained during the 
processing of the ongoing task as well.  
 The role of the PM cues in the mediation of the reward value is further emphasized 
by the fact that the activation on high reward PM trials correlated with individual levels 
of BAS reward responsiveness. These results suggest that reward expectations were 
elicited by the appearance of the PM cues. While we can assume that reward 
expectations were maintained in all participants, individual reward sensitivity was 
directly linked to the level of reward-related activation.   
 Further support as to the existence of reward-related changes in the processes 
underlying PM comes from the fact that we found individual response times to be 
modulated by reward magnitude and that these effects were associated with a parallel 
modulation of midbrain activation.    
 Moreover, individual differences in reward responsiveness were found to relate to 
activation differences in the ventral striatum for PM cues. This region has been reported 
to relate to positive arousal associated with reward anticipation (Knutson, et al., 2005).  
 In our study, activity in the ventral striatal region was most pronounced for the 
interaction of PM status and incentive motivation. These results are in line with recent 
findings of the involvement of the nucleus accumbens in the processing of both the 
valence and the salience of appetitive stimuli (Cooper & Knutson, 2008). Here, we 
show that the ventral striatal region is sensitive to the distinction between PM and 
ongoing trials. Evidence from a recent study investigating the effects of alternative 
available options on nucleus accumbens activation suggests that this region represents 
the incentive value relative to the current context of available gains and losses, with the 
worst available loss serving as an anchor for the computation of the relative value of an 
event (Cooper, Hollon, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In the 
present data, such an anchor effect could have played out in the loss condition, leading 
to a clear distinction between the actual loss events (PM) and events not as clearly 
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linked to the potential loss (ongoing trials), while the PM-ongoing distinction was not as 
clear-cut in the reward conditions. 
 An additional factor, or else, an alternative explanation, is the increase in positive 
arousal associated with high reward. As mentioned above, activation in the nucleus 
accumbens has been associated with high arousal ratings in the case of high reward 
anticipation. In our study, high reward did not only lead to higher midbrain activation, 
but also in amygdala activation, which was greatest when reward was high, even 
compared to the avoidance of a loss of the same size. Greater intensity of high reward 
events, especially for ongoing (i.e., anticipation) trials, could explain the decrease in the 
activation difference between PM and ongoing trials under high reward. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 The aim of the present study was to tie together findings of reward modulations in 
goal-directed behavior and aspects of goal achievement in prospective remembering. 
The present findings suggest that reward expectations pertaining to the PM intention 
have to be taken into account when the neural substrates underlying PM are 
investigated.  
 In particular, we have shown here that information about the incentive value of an 
upcoming PM cue is represented in activation differences in reward-related limbic brain 
structures. Moreover, our results suggest that the extent of these differences is largest 
under high reward conditions.  
Specifically, we report that in the PM context, high reward leads to an increase in 
activation in the midbrain and in the amygdala, which is accompanied by a performance 
increase. Based on the present findings, we suggest that the role of the frontopolar 
cortex in PM is to monitor switching processes in response to PM cues, irrespective of 
the incentive value or the size of the incentive that is associated with those cues. 
However, we present evidence that, under high reward, the functional connectivity 
between reward-related midbrain regions and the frontopolar cortex is enhanced, 
especially in the case of reward-related performance increases.  
 We further report that reward-related activation differences in the midbrain and in the 
ventral striatum in the context of PM are linked to individual reward sensitivity. 
 We conclude that reward expectations can be part of PM and that the neural 
substrates supporting these reward expectations are integrated into the neural processes 
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underlying intact PM performance.  
 
6.4 Outlook 
 The present study investigated the effects of reward on the neural mechanisms 
supporting prospective memory. It was observed that reward effects were primarily 
mediated by regions traditionally associated with the processing of reward features such 
as the midbrain and the striatum, whereas frontopolar regions were not responsive to 
reward levels per se, but showed enhanced connectivity to the midbrain region for 
highly motivating events. Although these findings are in line with recent reports of 
frontopolar function in the monitoring, but not anticipation, of rewards, there are several 
open questions that further studies could investigate.  
 First, it should be established if the frontopolar cortex is indeed not sensitive to 
differences between rewarded and non-rewarded PM cues. For the reasons outlined 
above, high reward PM cues were compared to low reward PM cues, but no non-reward 
condition was included in the present study. Although the present results demonstrate 
that this difference led to distinct neural processing in midbrain and striatal regions, the 
possibility that the frontopolar cortex would be responsive to the difference between 
reward and non-reward should be ruled out by including this additional condition in 
further studies.  
 Beyond this, it would be particularly interesting to manipulate reward contingencies 
separately for the ongoing and the PM task. Charron and Koechlin (2010) have 
demonstrated that frontopolar cortex activity increases in response to the combination of 
rewards in two tasks. Thus, for example, a PM paradigm could be developed in which 
some PM cues, but also some ongoing trials lead to a high reward, whereas other PM 
and ongoing trials are associated with low reward. Accordingly, PM and ongoing 
failures would result in high or low punishment. This would allow for an investigation 
of a putative boosting of the already more salient PM, compared to the ongoing trials. A 
clinical aspect of this issue would involve the question if patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (in which basal ganglia dysfunction has been proposed to play a 
role), or even healthy individual with high levels of conscientiousness, could actually 
refrain from checking or excessively monitoring for PM cues when the ongoing task is 
associated with high reward, supposedly counteracting the satisfaction coming from the 
execution of the compulsive action. 
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 A more applied, developmental perspective on motivation and PM would involve the 
investigation of the neural processes underlying the age prospective memory paradox by 
examining reward effects on the neural mechanisms supporting PM performance by 
means of fMRI in groups of young and old adults.  
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